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MARK SQUILLACE*
Water Transfers for a Changing
Climate1
ABSTRACT
The prior appropriation doctrine that dominates the water laws of the
Western United States was perhaps the inevitable consequence of the
need to manage water resources in a region where the demand for
water often exceeds the supply. This doctrine has proved surpris-
ingly clumsy at accommodating changing water needs during times
of shortage. Economists have long viewed water markets as an at-
tractive solution for reallocating water to meet the demands of an
evolving community of water users. But most western states have
been skeptical—sometimes even hostile—to proposed changes in his-
toric water use patterns. This reluctance to encourage the transfer of
existing water rights to serve critical new water needs too often leads
to the development of new and expensive water projects with serious
adverse environmental consequences. Still, many water transfers
have gone forward and many involve moving water from agricul-
tural to urban use. This is not surprising since most of the water
used in the West goes to irrigated agriculture and most of the new
demand is coming from the West’s burgeoning urban centers. But
for a variety of reasons, transfer activity has proved inadequate to
accommodate these growing needs. Climate change now threatens to
exacerbate this problem, by diminishing water supplies in some of
the most arid regions of the West. New ways of thinking about real-
locating water could go a long way to solving this problem. This
article offers concrete recommendations for promoting robust water
markets that can address water shortages that are otherwise likely to
confront the West. The article concludes with a series of practical
and creative ways for reforming western water law to help ensure
that water gets to where it is needed most efficiently.
* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Law Center, University of
Colorado Law School.
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outstanding law students including Anshul Bagga, Laura Brown, Stephen Chesterton,
Asher Kohn, Mystery Murphy, John Newman, Erica Steidl, Mohitindervir Sandhu, Lisa
Smith and Veronique Van Gheem.
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I. Introduction
For decades, resource economists and policy wonks have touted
the value of water markets to solve water scarcity problems.2 Water mar-
kets have special appeal in the western United States where the prior
appropriation doctrine favors historic, low-value agricultural water
rights over far more valuable domestic water rights.3 Yet despite the al-
lure of water markets to move water—especially from agricultural to ur-
ban use—the legal, political, and practical obstacles to the operation of
such markets have proven far more intractable than market theory
would predict.4 Overcoming these obstacles is not just about promoting
economic efficiency. It is also about protecting the environment and min-
imizing impacts on communities in remote water basins that have often
become the target for seemingly insatiable demands of growing urban
centers. These remote communities are most vulnerable when water
markets fail.5
The need to reform current law as it relates to water transfers is
especially urgent because of the anticipated impacts of climate change.
2. See TERRY L. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983); see also
Harrison C. Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment of Western Water Resources, 66 NEB. L.
REV. 76, 78 (1987) (“Discussion of ‘water marketing’ is much in the air, as are other means
for promoting increased efficiency in the use of water.”); Ronald C. Griffin & Fred O.
Boadu, Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunities for Reform, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265, 276
(1992) (“Overall, there are some compelling reasons to believe that surface water marketing
is serving the state well.”).
3. The consumptive municipal use of water in Denver, Colorado amounts to 234,000
acre-feet per year, which is equivalent to 2% of all of Colorado’s state-wide consumptive
use. About Us, Denver Water’s Water Use, available at www.denverwater.org/AboutUs/
KeyFacts/. Metropolitan Denver has a gross municipal product of $152.8 billion, which is
approximately 66% of the Colorado State gross domestic product (GDP) of $231.6 billion.
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, 2011, available at http://www.bea.gov/
newsreleases/regional/gdp_metro/2011/pdf/gdp_metro0211.pdf. Irrigation in the state
of Colorado accounted for 90% of the consumptive use within the state in 2005. ESTIMATED
USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior
(2005), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1344/pdf/c1344.pdf. Net farm income in
Colorado accounted for $745 million or approximately 0.3% percent of the state gross do-
mestic product in 2009. State Fact Sheets: Colorado, U.S.D.A. (July 11, 2011), available at http:/
/www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/CO.HTM.
4. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 2:13 (1988).
5. Kenneth R. Weber, Effects of Water Transfers on Rural Areas: A Response to Shupe,
Weatherford, and Checchio, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13 (1990); Steven J. Shupe, et al., Western
Water Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413, 428–30 (1989) (“Water right
transfers threaten not only county tax bases, but also the overall economic health of rural
areas . . . The overall quality and character of life can be undermined in areas where his-
toric irrigation suddenly is terminated.”); George A. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 457, 473–75 (1989).
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The example that perhaps best illustrates this point is the Colorado River
Basin. The Colorado River plays an important role in the economic
health and water supplies of seven western states,6 as well as Mexico and
various native tribes.7 A complex web of laws, interstate compacts, and
government policies have helped to shape water allocations among the
parties, and despite some early, overly optimistic assumptions about the
available water supply,8 the parties have historically managed to satisfy
most of their water needs.9 Unfortunately, water use in the Basin has
finally caught up with the supply,10 and climate change is projected to
reduce Colorado River flows by over nine percent by 2060.11 Although 9
percent may seem like a modest reduction in overall flows, such a loss
could seriously disrupt the precarious balance of rights that currently
exists among the states.12 Moreover, the impact of this loss of approxi-
mately 1.35 million acre-feet (MAF) of the average annual flows of 15
MAF13 would likely be concentrated in the Upper Basin States.14 Since
6. The seven Colorado River Basin states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
7. David H. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
413, 413–14 (1984–1985).
8. James S. Lochhead, Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from the
Colorado River Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 291, 317–19 (2000–2001)
(discussing the mistaken water estimates of the 1922 compact); Stuart H. Burness & James
P. Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 111, 114 (1980) (discussing that earlier estimates of river flow were biased upwards).
9. Getches, supra note 7, at 420. R
10. Interim Report No. 1: Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study, Figure 1,
SR-4; Figure 2, SR-7, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, (June 2011), available at http://www.
usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/Report1/StatusRpt.pdf.
11. Id. at B-76.
12. Id. at SR-6.
13. Id. at B-26.
14. The Upper Basin states are Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
Colorado River Compact Colorado River Compact, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-5, art. II(b)
(1922); See § 72-15-5, art. III(a); see also Charles J. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado
River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367, 388-89 (1966–1967) (noting that the nego-
tiators of the Colorado River Compact of 1922 assumed that the Upper and Lower Basins
would each receive approximately 7.5 MAF annually with an additional 1.5 MAF going to
Mexico).
Unfortunately, the assumption that at least 16.5 MAF of water would be available
on average annually has proven wrong. Douglas Kenney, Rethinking the Future of the Colo-
rado River: Draft Interim Report of the Colorado River Governance Initiative 70 (2010), available at
http://www.waterpolicy.info/archives/docs/CRGI-Interim-Report.pdf. In fact, only
about 15 MAF has been available and in the decade from 2001–2010, flows averaged only
about 12 MAF. Id. at 17, 70; see also Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study,
Interim Report No.1, Bureau of Reclamation (June 2011), available at http://www.usbr.gov/
lc/region/programs/crbstudy/report1.html. The reason that the Upper Basin states are ex-
pected to bear the brunt of any reduced flows is because the Compact does not actually
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well over 80 percent of the Upper Basin’s water is consumed by agricul-
tural crops15—much of it for lower-value feed crops16—transfers of water
from agricultural to urban use appear to be an obvious solution to the
water shortages that may ultimately face the Upper Basin.
This article offers concrete solutions to promote the development
of robust water markets. It begins with a review of water transfers in the
western United States and historical water use patterns that help illumi-
nate the problem. It then considers several case studies designed to help
illustrate the opportunities and obstacles to the efficient movement of
water. I focus in particular on the Northern Colorado Water Conser-
vancy District (NCWCD) and its innovative mechanism for transferring
water from its Colorado-Big Thompson Project, and on a still evolving
split the available flows between the Upper and Lower Basins, but instead requires the
Upper Basin to “not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggre-
gate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years.” Art. III(d); Kenney,
supra at 13, 43. In addition, the Upper Basin essentially shares with the Lower Basin the
obligation to satisfy Mexico’s treaty entitlement of 1.5 MAF. Art. III(c); Utilization of Wa-
ters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande art. 10(a), U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3,
1944, T.S. No. 994; Thus, the Lower Basin states appear to have rights that are more or less
fixed, although the Lower Basin’s obligation to share deliveries to Mexico could conceiva-
bly reduce its share by 0.75 MAF/year annually. Kenney, supra at 37, 42–43. The Compact
does allow the Upper Basin to retain priority rights over any water allocated before the
1922 Compact was signed (Art. VIII), but these appropriations are only about 2.2 MAF. Id.
at 48.
15. In the Upper Basin states, irrigation accounted for 87% of total water use in 2005.
ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 3. R
16. In 2007, there were 2,296,765 acres of irrigated harvested cropland in Colorado.
2007 Census Publications: Colorado, United States Department of Agriculture: The Census of
Agriculture, Table 10, available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full
_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_State_Level/Colorado/st08_1_009_010.pdf. Of those acres,
81% were used for hay and corn grown for grain, silage or greenchop. Id. at Table 33,
available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/Volume_1,_
Chapter_1_State_Level/Colorado/st08_1_033_033.pdf. 727,118 acres grew corn for grain,
silage or greenchop and 1,139,480 acres grew hay. Id. Note that “[i]f two or more crops
were harvested from the same land during the year (double cropping), the acres were
counted for each crop. Therefore, the total acres of all crops harvested generally exceeded
the acres of cropland harvested. An exception to this procedure was hay crops. When more
than one cutting of hay was taken from the same acres, the acres were counted only once
for the harvesting method but the quantity harvested includes all cuttings. Acreage cut and
tons harvested for both dry hay and haylage, silage, or greenchop was reported for each
crop. For inter-planted crops or ‘’skip-row’’ crops, acres were reported according to the
portion of the field occupied, whether by a crop or whether it was idle land. If a crop was
inter-planted in an orchard or vineyard and harvested, then the entire orchard or vineyard
acreage was reported under the appropriate fruit crop and the inter-planted estimated crop
acreage was reported under the appropriate crop.” Id. at Appendix B, B-4, available at http:/
/www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_State_
Level/Colorado/coappxb.pdf.
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proposal—often described as the “Super Ditch,”—that seeks to move
water from agricultural to urban use without requiring farmers to relin-
quish control over their water rights. The article then derives lessons
from these and other examples, and concludes with a series of recom-
mendations for reforming western water law in ways that will promote
sensible water transfers.
II. The Law of Water Transfers
From its earliest incarnations, the prior appropriation doctrine
that evolved in most western states allowed users to transfer perfected17
water rights from their original use to some other beneficial use.18 The
interdependent nature of most prior appropriation water rights, how-
ever, persuaded these states to authorize such transfers only where they
could be carried out without injury to existing users.19 Such injuries may
occur, for example, where transfers reduce the amount or timing of re-
turn flows.20 Moreover, in order to avoid burdening existing users with
17. As a general rule, states do not allow parties to transfer unperfected rights— that
is rights that have not been applied to the beneficial use for which they were authorized—
in part because of the fear that allowing such transfers would promote speculation. See, e.g.,
Catherland Reclamation Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 433 N.W. 2d
161, 165 (Neb. 1988); Green River Development Co. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339, 344 (Wyo.
1983).
18. At least one western state — Wyoming — initially prohibited transfers entirely. See
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (2011), which to this day provides in relevant part that “[w]ater
rights for the direct use of the natural unstored flow of any stream cannot be detached from
the lands, place or purpose for which they are acquired. . ..” This prohibition has since been
superseded by an express provision that allows transfers, but only under strict conditions.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (2011). Other western states have taken a more liberal view of
transfers, but generally subject to the “no injury” standard. For example, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-172 (2011) allows water transfers with some limitations. “A water right may be
severed from the land to which it is appurtenant or from the site of its use if for other than
irrigation purposes and with the consent and approval of the owner of such right may be
transferred. . ..” Id.
19. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172(A)(2) (2011) states in relevant part that, “[v]ested or
existing rights to the use of water shall not be affected, infringed upon nor interfered with,
and in no event shall the water diverted or used after the transfer of such rights exceed the
vested rights existing at the time of such severance and transfer. . ..” CAL. WATER CODE
§ 1745.07 (2011) states in relevant part that “[n]o transfer of water pursuant to this article or
any other provision of law shall cause a forfeiture, diminution, or impairment of any water
rights.”
20. See e.g., Phoenix Water Co. v. Fletcher, 23 Cal. 481, 487 (Cal. 1863); Lawrence J.
MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Search for Smarter
Approaches, 2 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 27, 29 (1994) (“The understanding
reached in Colorado is that a proposed transfer should be considered in terms of its net
depletive effects on the stream and on the manner in which it would change the timing of
flows. A reduction in the historical availability of water to another appropriator, either
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the need to prove injury, many states place the burden of showing “no
injury” on the proponent of the transfer.21 Some states restrict transfers
even beyond these requirements. Wyoming, for example, limits transfers
to those that will not increase the historic, consumptive, beneficial use of
the water resource, or reduce historic return flows—even if injury to ex-
isting users cannot be shown.22
On its face, the “no injury” rule is simple and sensible. It helps
ensure that the compact to honor priorities among water users on a
given stream is not upset by changes to the system instigated by an ex-
isting user or her successor.23 Unfortunately, as currently implemented,
the no injury rule often imposes extraordinary transaction costs, prima-
rily in the form of legal and expert fees. In particular, uncertainties about
because of increased depletion by the new use or because the new use changes the timing
with which the water is available to other appropriators, will be regarded as an injury to
those appropriators and will not be permitted.”).
21. See, e.g., Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass’n. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 58
(Colo. 1999), which held in part that, “[i]n a change of use and augmentation case, applicant
seeking change must demonstrate that the timing of diversions and the quantity of con-
sumption for the changed use will not exceed those of the perfected appropriation, and that
return flows of native waters from the decreed use at its place of use-upon which junior
appropriators and prospective new appropriators often depend for their supply-will not be
diminished.”; see also Farmer’s High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189,
197 (Colo. 1999), which held in relevant part that, “[i]t is the water court’s duty to hear
testimony regarding the alleged injurious effects of the change of use of water and to aid
the parties in crafting conditions of water rights decree to prevent such injury.” Put differ-
ently, “[c]hanging the place of diversion of adjudicated water rights cannot enlarge or ex-
pand the water right at the expense of other appropriators or the state.” W.S. Ranch Co. v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 439 P.2d 714,718 (N.M. 1968).
22. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (2011) (“The change in use, or change in place of
use, may be allowed, provided that the quantity of water transferred by the granting of the
petition shall not exceed the amount of water historically diverted under the existing use,
nor exceed the historic rate of diversion under the existing use, nor increase the historic
amount consumptively used under the existing use, nor decrease the historic amount of
return flow, nor in any manner injure other lawful appropriators.”). See also Basin Elec.
Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 567 (Wyo. 1978) (“[T]he Board of Control
properly interpreted § 41-3-104, supra, as requiring separate consideration of and limita-
tion to historical consumptive uses even though injury to other appropriators was not at
issue.”). In its original water statutes, drafted in large measure by Wyoming’s first State
Engineer, Elwood Mead, Wyoming prohibited water transfers altogether. Mark Squillace,
Water Marketing in Wyoming, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 865, 884 (1989). This legislation reflected
Mead’s concern that speculators would hoard the state’s water resources in a manner detri-
mental to the public interest. Id. The prohibition of water transfers in Wyoming gradually
gave way to the current law, which allows transfers, albeit subject to additional restrictions
beyond the typical “no injury” rule. Id.
23. MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 20, at 30–31. (“At one level, such protection [the no R
injury rule] makes eminent good sense; transfers ought not to leave other water users in the
same system worse off.”).
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the scope and extent of injuries from a proposed transfer encourage par-
ties on both sides to hire experts to predict an outcome that favors the
legal position of their clients.24 In addition to the significant costs associ-
ated with proving or disproving injury, all of this also takes considerable
time, which means that a transfer applicant may not know for several
years whether her application will be approved, and if it is approved
how much water will be authorized for transfer if it is approved.25 Litiga-
tion, of course, can add substantially to the time, cost, and uncertainty
surrounding any transfer proposal.26
Arguably, much of the cost and uncertainty associated with water
transfers can be traced to the resistance of the agricultural community to
any transfers that propose moving water out of agricultural use.27 This
resistance stems, in large part, from the threats that water transfers pose
to the economic stability of rural communities.28 Perhaps most obviously,
moving water from farms to cities usually means a loss of the economic
activity associated with that farm.29
24. Injuries may result not only from the loss of water resources from a particular
basin, but also the loss of late season flows that often result from the application of water to
upstream agricultural lands. See Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1973); see also John H.
Davidson, Reallocation, Transfer, and Change Elements, in WATER AND WATER RIGHTS,
§14.04(c) (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991).
25. See e.g., Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S. Kenney, Watering Growth in Colorado: Swept
Along by the Current or Choosing a Better Line, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 411, 420 (2003)
(“Complex cases can stretch over years and attract dozens of opponents. For example, liti-
gation over Union Park extended from 1984 through 2000, and included over twenty par-
ties.” Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of Arapahoe v. Crystal Creek Homeowners Ass’n,
14 P.3d 325, 329 (Colo. 2000)); Id. at 421. (“Although engineers can estimate the yield of a
water right, adjudication is necessary to determine consumptive use. Thus, purchasers of
existing rights for new municipal uses may not know in advance the actual yield of the
rights they are purchasing for transfer. The junior protection rule [COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-
902-305(3)] guarantees in many, perhaps most, situations that not all of a water right can be
transferred, and it is not apparent at the time of filing a change case which junior appropri-
ators will be injured and what will be necessary to keep them whole, even with extensive
engineering.”). See also Bonny Colby Saliba et al., Do Water Market Prices Appropriately Mea-
sure Water Values, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 617, 621 (1987) (explaining that when individuals
are unable to ascertain the legal rights and restrictions of a water purchase, they are un-
likely to purchase a water right).
26. See, e.g., Nichols & Kenney, supra note 25, at 421–22 (2003). R
27. See, e.g., In re Application of Howard Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787, 788–89 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988) (responding to protestants challenge that a transfer of water rights to a ski resort
harmed the public welfare); MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 20, at 28. (“Purchases of agricul- R
tural lands in the Owens Valley and the associated water rights by the City of Los Angeles
earlier in this century, provoked so much controversy that it essentially ended water mar-
keting as a way of meeting urban water demands in California until the last ten years.”).
28. Shupe et al., supra note 5, at 428–29. R
29. Studies from California, Colorado, and Oregon confirm “that water availability is a
significant determinate of farmland value.” Economic Impacts of Climate Change on Agricul-
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Less obvious, but no less real, is the risk to the land itself. When
cities buy irrigated farmland for the purpose of transferring the water
resources, they have often engaged in what some have pejoratively
called “buy and dry”30 practices. “Buy and dry” refers to the situation
where the buyer essentially abandons the land after the water rights are
transferred without restoring the land to a stable and productive state.31
Thus, instead of reverting to native grasses that might contribute to a
bucolic setting attractive to tourists and new settlers, the land subject to
“buy and dry” practices may become infested with unattractive, oppor-
tunistic, non-native weeds, that further diminish the prospects for a vi-
brant rural economy. It is no wonder then that many people in rural
areas are hostile to water transfers and are often willing to work together
to block transfers or legal reforms that make transfers easier.32 Overcom-
ing, or at least neutralizing, this hostility is critical to improving the pros-
pects for a robust agricultural to urban transfer program.
To be sure, agricultural to urban water transfers still do occur,33
but the costs, delays, uncertainties, and political and social challenges
posed by water transfers combine to discourage many municipal water
suppliers from viewing such transfers as a viable option for solving their
water supply needs.34 Instead, many cities continue to rely on engineer-
ing solutions, despite the enormous environmental and economic costs
tural Water Use in California, 15 (2005), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publica-
tions/CEC-500-2005-054/CEC-500-2005-054.pdf, and http://are.berkeley.edu/~fisher/
ClimateChange.pdf; Brian E. Gray, The Shape of Transfers to Come: A Model Water Transfer
Act for California, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 23, 40 (1996) (discussing loss of
economic activity associated with transfer of water); Charles W. Howe & Christopher Goe-
mans, Economic Efficiency and Equity Considerations in Regional Water Transfers: A Comparative
Analysis of Two Basins in Colorado 13 (2003).
30. See, e.g., 26th Annual Water Law Conference: Twenty-First Century Water Supply,
Use and Distribution: Do the Rules Still Apply?, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 389, 405–06 (2008)
(“‘[B]uy and dry’ [is] the permanent transfer [of water] from agricultural use to municipal
use that can dry the land. . . . [T]he transfer is a one-time deal where municipalities buy
shares in a ditch company, often far from the municipality, and the water is permanently
removed from irrigation use by the ditch company. The irrigator and the region then can
suffer from the limited or lost agricultural productivity resulting from the water transfer.”).
31. See Id.
32. See e.g., In re Application of Howard Sleeper, supra note 27. See also Weber, supra R
note 5 (discussing the adverse effects on rural communities when water rights are lost). R
33. For example, the Fort-Collins-Loveland Water District, the city of Evans, and the
town of Lyons acquired from irrigators a total of 67 Colorado-Big Thompson units in Feb-
ruary 2009. 23 WATER STRATEGIST 2, Feb. 2009.
34. See, e.g., Sarah Klahn, The Blind Man and the Elephant: Describing Drought in Colo-
rado, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 519, 534 (2003). (“As in past droughts, the legislature has
determined that one solution is to build more storage projects . . .. The legislature adopted
Senate Bill 236, which requested voter approval to float $2 billion in bonds for reservoir
construction as a part of a so-called ‘drought-package.’”).
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of such proposals.35 Notwithstanding these obstacles, transfers are often
the most efficient way to address growing water demands.36 Legal re-
forms then must meaningfully address the very real problems histori-
cally created by transfers, while at the same time finding ways to
simplify and streamline the transfer process.
Of course, legal reforms carry risk. Some will argue that reforms
that facilitate transfers do so at the expense of existing users and, if they
go too far, might even result in an unconstitutional taking of existing
water rights.37 This issue is explored in greater detail below.38 Moreover,
for the reasons noted above, rural communities will undoubtedly per-
ceive a streamlined water transfers process as a vehicle for undermining
rural economies, and thus view reforms skeptically.
It is hard to deny that a simpler and less costly water transfer
system will likely move more water out of rural communities and into
urban areas since, as was previously noted, irrigated agriculture is far
and away the dominant consumptive use of water resources in the
West.39 Thus, it seems inevitable that cities looking for new water sup-
plies will cast their gaze toward agricultural communities. Agricultural
water rights are also attractive because they tend to be the most senior
rights.40 Moreover, while agriculture is an important component of the
35. See, e.g., Mark Squillace, Accounting for Water Rights in the Western United States, in
INTERNATIONAL WATER ACCOUNTING: EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF A SCARCE RESOURCE
(2012).
36. See e.g., Douglas S. Kenney, Relative Costs of New Water Supply Options for Front
Range Cities, Phase 1 Report 21 (July 2010) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.
rlch.org/archive/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/10_RR_Kenneycostofwater1.pdf. (“[O]ur
estimates of representative costs (in $/AF) are as follows: new projects, $16,200; water
transfers, $14,000; and conservation, $5,200.”).
37. If a transfer causes even a minor injury, the injured party could conceivably allege
a partial, physical taking of a water right. Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). Arguably though, a change in transfer laws that tolerate
minor injuries to existing rights would be viewed as regulatory and thus subject to the
more relaxed takings analysis of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978). Under this test, the regulation would be upheld so long as it did not inter-
fere with the reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the allegedly injured party.
38. See infra Section III.
39. For example, an estimated 90% of the total water consumed in Colorado was used
for irrigation in 2005. ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note
3. In Montana, 96% of the total water consumed was used for irrigation. Id. In California, R
irrigation accounted for 74% of total state water use. Id.
40. Moreover, much agricultural water is used to grow relatively low-value feed crops
or surplus crops that receive other government subsidies. See, e.g., Charles T. DuMars, Pub-
lic Policy Considerations in State Water Allocations and Management, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 24-1, 24-4 (1996) (“While the demand for urban uses is increasing, most senior water
rights remain in agricultural uses criticized by some as economically inefficient.”); Adam
Schempp, Western Water in the 21st Century: Policies and Programs that Stretch Supplies in a
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economies of these rural areas, it is not a significant part of the overall
economy in any western state.41 Indeed, even with the disincentives em-
bedded in the current system, agricultural to urban transfers seem to be
increasing.42
Still, water transfers remain a fraught option for urban communi-
ties seeking additional water supplies.43 As a result, proposals to develop
new water supplies—often at enormous financial and environmental
costs—abound.44 If the political, legal, and practical problems associated
with traditional transfers could be fixed, the demand for new engineer-
ing projects could very well disappear.45 The good news is that water
transfers can be optimized and made more attractive with relatively
modest reforms to current law. If western states are going to adapt sensi-
bly to climate change, then such reforms are vital.
A successful campaign to reform current transfer laws must
plainly account for the concerns of rural communities and ensure that
they will remain vibrant, even if they lose some water resources. If rural
communities instead perceive changes to water transfer laws as promot-
ing the “buy and dry” policies of the past, then such changes are not
likely to garner much political support. Fortunately, legal reforms that
address all of the legitimate concerns of rural areas are possible. While
the politics of reforming transfer laws will undoubtedly prove daunt-
ing—even with proposals that are sensitive to rural impacts—legal ob-
stacles to changing existing water transfer laws are relatively easy to
surmount.
Studying successful water transfer systems is the best way to un-
derstand opportunities for efficiently moving agricultural water to urban
use. To those who know water allocation law, it will come as no surprise
Prior Appropriation World, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10394, 10411 (2010) (“Water
rights can remain with lower value uses, such as agriculture (commonly the most senior
water rights).”); see also Dudley D. Johnson, An Optimal State of Water Law: Fixed Water
Rights and Flexible Market Prices, 57 VA. L. REV. 345 (1971) (discussing water allocation defi-
ciencies and possible solutions within existing allocation systems).
41. See generally ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 3. R
42. Charles W. Howe, Jeffrey K. Lazo & Kenneth R. Weber, The Economic Impacts of
Agriculture-to-Urban Water Transfers on the Area of Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River
Valley in Colorado, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1200, 1202 (1990) (Table 2 indicates that of all
agricultural to urban transfers, 48,389 acres were transferred in major transactions from
1955–1985. 129,210 acres will be potentially transferred from 1990-2013); PETER D. NICHOLS,
MEGAN K. MURPHY, & DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, WATER AND GROWTH IN COLORADO: A REVIEW
OF LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, 113 fig. 13b (2001), available at http://cstpr.colorado.edu/
wwa/products/Water_and_Growth_web_full_report.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Nichols & Kenney, supra note 25, at 421–22.
44. See supra note 34, at 534–35.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 90–91. R
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that many of these systems have evolved in the context of special pur-
pose water districts46 and mutual ditch companies.47 Such districts and
companies often hold substantial water rights that are commonly availa-
ble for a wide range of uses anywhere within the boundaries of what are
sometimes rather large geographic areas.48 Changing the use or place of
use of such water—that is “transferring” the water—falls outside the
scope of state transfer laws so long as the use is of a type and at a place
authorized under the original grant.49 Since special purpose districts and
mutual ditch companies provide well over half the water to water users
in the West,50 focusing reform efforts on such agencies could be an effi-
cient way to modernize water transfer law. At a minimum, and, as will
be shown, the operation of these agencies can inform proposals to
change water transfer laws generally by providing examples of the effi-
cient reallocation of water.
III. Water Transfers and the Takings Clause
One of the great myths of western water law is that water rights
are property rights that are essentially inviolable. To be sure, water
rights are vested property rights, and unless users abandon or waste
those rights the State cannot generally reclaim them without paying just
46. It is difficult to simplify descriptions of these districts, other than to say that they
are quasi-governmental agencies organized in accordance with detailed legislation adopted
in the various states. John Leshy once aptly noted that the “practical impossibility of gener-
alizing about modern special water districts. They are, in fact, rather like snowflakes, each
with its own unique form. Many of these typically lengthy statutes apply to only one or a
handful of districts, and only a few lawyers and district managers may be familiar with
their provisions.” JOHN D. LESHY, Special Water Districts – The Historical Background, in James
Corbridge, Ed., SPECIAL WATER DISTRICTS: CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE, Natural
Resources Law Center, Boulder, Colorado (1983).
47. See JOHN H. DAVIDSON, Mutual Ditch or Water Corporations, in WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, §26.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (explaining that mutual ditch companies are “usu-
ally in the form of a non-profit corporation organized for the exclusive benefit of the users
in a particular area who became its stockholders,“ with the goal of ”provid[ing] a vehicle
for organizing the distribution of water so that the individual water users were relieved of
the burden of managing the ditch.”).
48. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 137, (“Perhaps the most unique feature of the R
CBT project—and most relevant to this study—is that CBT water rights are represented by
310,000 shares or units”) Shupe et al., supra note 5, at 423–24. R
49. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 168.
50. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Mar-
kets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671, 688 tbl.2 (1993) (In 1978, public water districts supplied 56.8% of
California’s water, mutuals supplied 9.0%; public water districts supplied 7.1% of Colo-
rado’s water, mutuals supplied 69.9%; public water districts supplied 24.7% of Wyoming’s
water, mutuals supplied 30.7%.).
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compensation.51 However, the State cannot manage or restrict the uses of
water rights in ways that go beyond the restrictions imposed in the origi-
nal grants. Such post-acquisition restrictions are common to most forms
of property and do not inevitably lead to a valid claim that the property
rights have been unconstitutionally “taken.”52
Moreover, for several reasons, water rights are among the most
tenuous forms of property. As such, they have one of the least compel-
ling claims to be free from government restrictions, even where such re-
strictions are imposed after the rights are perfected. First, the State owns
all water resources in every American state with positive water law. A
water right gives only a right to use the water, and while even use rights
can be quite valuable, States historically gave them to water users for
free.53 While this largesse does not allow the State to withdraw these
rights, States have always claimed the power to set rules to regulate,
among other things, the allocation of water, abandonment and forfeiture
of rights, transfers of water rights, and beneficial use of water resources.
And as with forms of real property, States may sometimes add new rules
or set new restrictions on existing water rights without compensating the
owner. Those new rules are not likely to lead to a valid “takings” claims
unless they interfere with the owner’s “distinct investment-backed
expectations.”54
Furthermore, minor departures from the priority system are com-
mon in the prior appropriation system, and are tolerated even where
they might harm vested water rights. For example, the fact that an inac-
curate flume might injure another water user by effectively allowing the
diversion of more than one’s entitlement,55 or the fact that an appropria-
tor might change crops and thereby consume more water in a manner
detrimental to an existing user, will not generally trigger a valid legal
claim by an injured water users. Likewise, existing users may recapture,
51. See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 2 (2002). Compare Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001), with Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. U.S., 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005).
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“. . .nor shall private property be taken for a public use
without just compensation.”); see also Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding
post acquisition restrictions and corresponding diminution of value against a takings chal-
lenge); See also Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
53. One notable exception is the State of Montana, which provides for leasing large
water rights from the State. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-407 (2011).
54. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N. Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
55. A flume is an artificial channel or trough constructed to divert and measure water
flows through a stream or river. Inaccuracies may arise from the poor construction of a
flume, resulting in a shift of the flume’s foundation or submerging of the flume. Addition-
ally trash and sediment can become trapped in a flume and lead to inaccurate measure-
ment. See Squillace, supra note 35 at 271–72. R
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reuse and thereby consume more water than they historically consumed,
to the detriment of other users, without giving rise to a valid cause of
action.56 Tolerating such vagaries in the priority system is probably sensi-
ble and perhaps even necessary to operating the system efficiently, but it
also illustrates how a water right is not the inviolate form of property
that some wish to claim for it.
To be sure, claims that a state or federal rule gives rise to an un-
constitutional taking do sometimes arise, and can be successful.57 One
strategy, for example, is to argue that a restriction curtailing the amount
of water available to a user amounts to a partial “physical taking” of the
water. The Supreme Court has suggested that a physical taking consti-
tutes a per se taking of property.58 However, unless the state is physically
appropriating the water for its own use, courts are more likely to subject
the restrictions to the more forgiving test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.59 There the
Court held that a regulation restricting the use of property should be
upheld unless it interfered with the owners “distinct investment backed
expectations.”60
Given the widespread tolerance for minor injuries to water rights
that occur under the current prior appropriation system, it seems un-
likely that injuries to existing users—resulting from modest changes in
the current water transfers system—would interfere with the distinct, in-
vestment-backed expectations of the existing user.
56. See City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996); Binning v.
Miller, 102 P.2d 54 (Wyo. 1940); Dep’t. of Ecology v. United States Bureau of Reclamation,
827 P.2d 275 (Wash. 1992).
57. See, e.g., Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d. 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2012). (“The govern-
ment, for example, could not entirely fence off a water source, such as a lake, and prevent a
water rights holder from accessing such water. Assuming the other criteria for a Fifth
Amendment taking were met, such fencing could be a taking.”).
58. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 35–36
(1982). (Holding that a permanent physical occupation of private property, however minor,
results in a per se taking, regardless of the public interest advanced by the occupation.); see
also Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Sacramento Graz-
ing Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 175 (2010). As with any property, the physical
taking of a water right requires physical occupation, such as a diversion, in order to impli-
cate the Penn Central test.
59. 438 U.S. at 124.
60. Id. at 124. The Court also considered the “the character of the governmental ac-
tion,” referring specifically to the notion that a physical invasion is more likely to support a
takings claim. Id.
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IV. The Economics of Water Transfers
The story of water transfers in the western United States is largely
a story of market failure.61 Although water transfers occur on a fairly
regular basis in most western states,62 they do not occur as quickly or as
easily as they would likely occur in a free market, even where water
supplies are stressed.63 Furthermore, the transaction costs associated
with many proposed transfers often prove prohibitive.64
Understanding why water markets have historically failed to pro-
vide for efficient water reallocation requires a review of basic
microeconomic theory. A competitive market typically exhibits the fol-
lowing characteristics: (1) a large number of buyers and sellers; (2) prod-
ucts that are fungible, or indistinguishable to consumers; (3) consumers
and producers with perfect information about prices and quality; and (4)
firms with equal knowledge of and access to relevant technology.65 Mar-
kets lacking one or more of these characteristics may fail to allocate
goods efficiently.
61. See, e.g., L.M. HARTMAN AND DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFI-
CIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS 1 (1970); see also J.F. Booker et al., Economics and the
Modeling of Water Resources and Policies, NAT. RES. MODEL, Feb 2012, at 173 (“[C]ompetitive
markets for water are rare if not absent throughout the world.”).
62. See Bonnie G. Colby, Mark A. McGinnis & Ken Rait, Procedural Aspects of State
Water Law: Transferring Water Rights in the Western States, Water Transfer Symposium, 31 ARIZ.
L. REV. 697, 697 (1989) (summarizing the procedural differences in the evaluation of water
right change applications across eight western states); see also C.W. Howe, J.K. Lazo, & K.R.
Weber, supra note 42, at 1200 (1990) (“A major U.S. Geological Survey-funded study
(MacDonnell, et al.) has found frequent water transfers in several western states (Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah) but infrequent transfers in other states (e.g., California and Wyoming),
the frequency being strongly affected by the institutional structure for effecting transfers
and the pressure on water supplies.”).
63. In economic terms, supplies are likely to be stressed when the demand for water is
high and the supply comparatively low.
64. See, e.g., Nichols & Kenney, supra note 25, at 422. (“The minimal transaction costs of R
acquiring existing trans-basin diversions for municipal use are a sharp contrast to the ex-
treme costs associated with newly proposed trans-basin diversions. For example, the
American Water Development, Inc. (“AWDI”) proposal to export water from the San Luis
Valley to the Denver Metro area consumed nine years and several million dollars in attor-
neys’ fees and engineering fees associated with expert testimony presented in court.”; The
Colorado Supreme Court ended AWDI’s plans when it upheld the District Court’s dismis-
sal of AWDI’s water rights application. Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d
352, 357, 359, 368 (Colo. 1994); see also Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs & Peter Butler,
Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Transaction Costs as Determinants].
65. DAVID BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 330 (4th ed. 2011).
The authors suggest that water markets seem to fail primarily because water rights are not
fungible and to a lesser extent because information about price and value is likely
imperfect.
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At first blush, water rights might seem to fit the bill reasonably
well. Many people own water rights and many others are interested in
buying those rights. Basic information about the sale price of water is
reasonably well-known,66 and interested parties have some sense about
the value of water in individual water basins.67A closer look reveals
some structural problems that will have to be overcome if the free mar-
ket in water is ever going to thrive. In particular, under the current legal
system, water rights often fail the fungibility test because they are not
homogenous. Moreover, the limited number of transfers and the Colo-
rado-Big Thompson (CBT) market’s dominant influence in the transfer
picture may skew information about the price and quality of water.68
In order to be fungible, a water right must be essentially the same
anywhere it is available within a given geographic market.69 Put another
way, if water rights were fungible, a buyer interested in purchasing an
acre-foot of water should be able to walk into a marketplace and
purchase that acre-foot of water at a negotiated price, and then take that
water to the desired point of end use. To be sure, the location and quality
of that acre-foot of water may affect the price since it will have to be
delivered to the point of use, and perhaps treated to bring it to the qual-
ity required for that use. But the value of property is commonly depen-
dent on location and quality, and such differences by themselves should
not deter water transactions. The real obstacle to the fungibility of water
rights seems to be the uncertainty that the no injury rule brings to the
transfer.70 Uncertainty causes significant delays and denies the buyer the
ability to know exactly how much water will be available for use after
the transfer.71 Thus, the buyer cannot accurately compare the cost of
66. See David S. Brookshire et al., Market Prices for Water in the Semiarid West of the
United States, 40 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 1 (2004).
67. Decisions to pursue engineering solutions, for example, are generally weighed
against the relative cost of acquiring water through transfers. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, OMAHA DIST., NORTHERN INTEGRATED SUPPLY PROJECT DEIS, ES- 7 (Apr. 2008),
available at http://www.northernwater.org/docs/NISP/MapsDocuments/ExecSummNisp
DeisApr08.pdf.
68. See infra, text accompanying notes 88–90. The Colorado Big Thompson project is R
discussed in greater detail at part V.A. of the article. See also BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra
note 65, at 330; Saliba et al., supra note 25 at 632. R
69. See Saliba et al., supra note 25, at 648. R
70. Id. at 617, 621 (explaining that when individuals are unable to ascertain the legal
rights and restrictions of a water purchase, they are unlikely to purchase a water right).
71. Id. at 645 (1987) (noting that legal, hydrologic, and economic uncertainties are pre-
sent in water markets and reduce market participation and distort market prices); see also
Transaction Costs as Determinants, supra note 64, at 397 (noting that because water transfers R
must go through the review of the Water Court or State Engineer, and because the Water
Court may impose conditions upon the transfer, the final transfer is likely to contain terms
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water available for transfer with water that might be available from a
water development project or some other source.72 Moreover, this uncer-
tainty greatly increases the transaction costs associated with transferring
water, and overcoming this uncertainty is too often an expensive, com-
plex, and time-consuming task.73
As previously described, the no injury rule allows any existing
water user who might be affected by a proposed transfer to block that
transfer even for minor injuries that might result from the proposed
changes to the water system. Such injuries might include, for example, a
change in the timing of return flows.74 Consequently, a water right taken
from one location on a stream is not fungible with a water right taken
from another location on that same stream if existing users are in a posi-
tion to complain about injuries, such as the loss of late season return
flows.
Importantly, this problem does not manifest itself with storage
water rights, which is why successful water markets are almost always
associated with stored water.75 Since stored water in the western United
States is typically collected in the spring as snow melts in the mountains,
the owner’s priorities are satisfied at the time of storage. Once the water
is stored, it is free from the “call of the river”76 and it can be quickly and
easily sold within the project area for the types of uses for which is was
not found in the original application such as restrictions on total volume, flow rate, and
timing).
72. See Saliba et al., supra note 25, at 651 (explaining that information regarding the R
amount and price of water as well as the restrictions that will be placed on the use of said
water are essential in the valuation process of a proposed transfer of water).
73. Uncertainties in water transfers lead to buyers and sellers bearing the cost of risks
that take the form of brokerage service fees, hydrology studies, and legal representation.
Transaction Costs as Determinants, supra note 64, at 397. These transaction costs become pro- R
hibitively large for most prospective parties to a transfer as is evidenced by the proposed
American Water Development, Inc. transfer that spent seven and a half years in court and
several million dollars in attorneys’ and engineering fees. See Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City
of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 357, 359 (Colo. 1994); see also Nichols & Kenney, supra note 25, at R
422; see also Howe, Lazo, & Weber supra note 42, at 1202 (“Water sales and subsequent R
transfers may be negotiated over several years. . .There is no such thing as a clean-cut water
transfer.”).
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §37-92-304 (2011).
75. See, e.g., Margaret Bushman LaBianca, The Arizona Water Bank and the Law of the
River, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 659, 676 (1998); Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water
Transfers: Implications for Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 13 (1995); see also
Booker et al., supra note 61, at 28 (“Economists have long suggested that market institutions R
such as water rights transfers and water banks have the potential to increase economic
efficiency relative to traditional water allocation institutions. . .”).
76. A call of the river allows senior water rights holders to require junior water rights
holders upstream to curtail use if senior rights holders are not receiving their entitled por-
tion due to low stream flow. Charles W. Howe, Water Law and Economics: An Assessment of
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originally approved, without review by state officials, and without con-
cern about injury. Most of the large storage projects are owned and man-
aged by special purpose water districts and mutual ditch companies,
which is one reason that these agencies have proved more capable of
transferring water efficiently.77
As already noted, one of the chief obstacles to making water
rights fungible is the inadequate definition of the property right. Western
water law has traditionally defined water rights in terms of the amount
of water that can be diverted out of a stream.78 While this may be a neces-
sary requirement for identifying a property right in water, it is hardly
sufficient if the goal is to promote a robust water market. The system
largely functions on the basis of the amount of water consumed, not the
amount of water diverted.79 More specifically, the diversion amount tells a
prospective buyer very little about the amount of water that might be
available for transfer. If water rights were defined both in terms of a
diversion amount and a consumptive use amount, the prospects for a
free market in water would brighten markedly.80 In particular, one can
easily imagine a thriving market of consumptive use amounts within a
single water basin, and perhaps even among multiple basins.
Of course, even defining water rights in terms of consumptive use
would not by itself make transfers any easier. As mentioned above, cur-
rent law in most jurisdictions explicitly recognizes the right of existing
water users to block transfers if they suffer injuries, even where the
transfer amount is limited to consumptive use.81 However, a relatively
simple change to the law would require water rights to be defined in
terms of their consumptive use and to presumptively allow that amount
to be transferred. Indeed, such a change would be easy to accommodate
under the current legal regime, would likely cause no greater injury than
River Calls and the South Platte Well Shut-Down, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 181, 181–82
(2008).
77. See supra text accompanying footnotes 23–27 for a discussion of a robust water
market and its accompanying storage facilities.
78. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 57 (Colo.
1999).
79. Id. at 51–59.
80. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Public Water-Private Water: Anti-Speculation, Water Re-
allocation and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Cons District, 10 U. DEN.
WATER L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (suggesting that consumptive use “effectively privatizes the
water.”); ANTONY FRANK AND DAVID CARLSON, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
COLORADO’S NET IRRIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AGRICULTURE, tbl.1 (1995), available at http:/
/cospl.coalliance.org/fez/eserv/co:3072/ag92ir71999internet.pdf; Nichols & Kenney, supra
note 25, at 421. R
81. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104(a) (2011).
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is already tolerated under the law, and could potentially limit other
forms of injury.
For example, in every western state, agricultural water users are
free to grow any crop they can successfully cultivate. But the choice of
crop greatly affects the amount of water consumed.82 In Colorado, alfalfa
typically consumes nearly two acre-feet of water per acre whereas sun-
flowers consume 1.34 acre-feet of water per acre.83 Yet an agricultural
user may freely switch from sunflowers to alfalfa, even if such a change
causes a significant injury to existing users. Likewise, in most western
states agricultural users are free to recapture and reuse water, so long as
they recapture and reuse the water for the same purpose, and on the
land for which the rights were appropriated.84 Users are free to reuse the
water even if such reuse increases the amount of water consumed.85 Fi-
nally, measuring the amount of water diverted through a ditch is far
from an exact science, and measurement errors are routinely tolerated,
even if they might cause injury to existing users.86 Defining water rights
in terms of consumptive use would ensure that efforts to recapture and
reuse, or to change crops would not result in the consumption of water
resources in excess of legal allotment.
Tolerating such errors in the allocation of a scarce resource like
water may be necessary and appropriate, but these examples highlight
the inconsistent way that water transfers are treated under the law. The
smallest injuries could result in the denial of a transfer application, but
farmers do not need approval to change to crops that could cause far
greater injuries to existing users. Allowing parties to transfer consump-
tive use amounts, without regard to the relatively minor injuries that
such transfers might cause, would help address the definitional problem
with water rights that exists under the current system, and could easily
be accomplished in accordance with property rights principles. The
courts have consistently recognized the power of government agencies
to impose modest constraints on the use of property without having to
82. SAVE THE POUDRE COAL., A REVIEW OF THE LIKELY AGRICULTURAL IMPACTS FROM THE
NORTHERN INTEGRATED SUPPLY PROJECT, app. A, tbl.4 (2008), available at http://www.
savethepoudre.org/docs/stp_ag_impacts_analysis.pdf.
83. ANTONY FRANK & DAVID CARLSON, COLORADO’S NET IRRIGATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
AGRICULTURE, 1995, tbl.1 (1999), available at http://cospl.coalliance.org/fez/eserv/co:3072/
ag92ir71999internet.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1774-76 (2011).
85. Id. at 1774.
86. See Squillace, supra note 35. R
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compensate the property owner for any possible loss of value.87 That
government agencies are able to impose such limits on the use of private
water rights should be especially clear in the context of a resource where
the property owner has only a use right and the State holds the corpus of
the right in trust for the people.88
The difficulties inherent in transferring water in the West have the
unfortunate effect of increasing the price of the limited supplies of water
that are readily available for transfer. This can be seen from the ease with
which users trade CBT units and the extraordinarily high price that these
units command in the market place.89 From 2007–2009 there were 353
permanent transfers in the western United States.90 Of those transfers, 61
percent—or 216 transfers—involved CBT units in Colorado.91 Put an-
other way, more than 60 percent of all transfer activity involved a single
project that represents a tiny fraction of total allocated water rights in the
western states. Prices for CBT units purchased in Colorado from
2007–2009 were also among the highest recorded for permanent transfers
in western states.92 The relative paucity of these transfers calls into ques-
87. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001).
88. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. X, § 5;
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 31.
89. See Booker et al., supra note 61, at 208 (“Gardner and Miller (1983) . . .. found that R
while most CBT shares at that time were held by agricultural users, prices fully reflected
expected values to future municipal and industrial buyers.”).
90. There were 135 permanent transfers in the west in 2007, 87 of which were for CBT
units. WATER STRATEGIST, 2007 ANNUAL TRANSACTION REVIEW 11–15 (2008). In 2008 there
were 116 permanent transfers, 69 of which involved CBT units. WATER STRATEGIST, 2008
ANNUAL TRANSACTION REVIEW 8–12 (2009). In 2009 there were 102 permanent transfers in
the western states, 60 of which involved CBT units. WATER STRATEGIST, 2009 ANNUAL
TRANSACTION REVIEW 9–13 (2010).
91. WATER STRATEGIST, 2007 ANNUAL TRANSACTION REVIEW 11–15 (2008); WATER STRAT-
EGIST, 2008 ANNUAL TRANSACTION REVIEW 8–12 (2009); WATER STRATEGIST, 2009 ANNUAL
TRANSACTION REVIEW 9–13 (2010).
92. In 2007, CBT units were purchased from $9,215–$10,500/unit ($11,519–$13,125/
AF) on average. WATER STRATEGIST, 2007 ANNUAL TRANSACTION REVIEW 18 (2008). These
prices were significantly higher than recorded prices for permanent transfers in most west-
ern states. Id. at 11–15. Examples of prices in other western states include purchases of
pumping rights to Edwards Aquifer in Texas for $5,000/AF and non-irrigation water rights
in Arizona for $1,200–$2,000/AF. Id. In 2008, average CBT prices ranged from
$9,215–$9,716/unit ($13,164–$13,880/AF), excluding certain November transactions be-
cause their price was negotiated in 2002. WATER STRATEGIST, 2008 ANNUAL TRANSACTION
REVIEW 16 (2009). In Texas, pumping rights for the Edwards aquifer again sold for $5,000/
AF and non-irrigation water rights in Arizona sold for $1,200–$2,000/AF. Id. Prices ranged
from $1,800–$3,650/AF in California in the Mojave River Basin. Id. CBT units in 2009 sold
for $7,133–$10,000/unit ($8,916–$12,500/AF) on average. WATER STRATEGIST, 2009 ANNUAL
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tion the adequacy of the public’s information about the true price of
water.
If the only consequence of this market failure in water resources
was that municipal residents were forced to pay a higher price for their
water, this might be an acceptable outcome. Yet, the consequences are far
more serious, especially in terms of environmental impacts. When a city
decides that it needs to secure additional water resources it has several
options. First, and perhaps most importantly, it can embark on a water
conservation program to reduce per capita consumption.93 Second, it can
purchase senior water rights (or farmlands that include senior water
rights) and begin the process of transferring that water to municipal
use.94 As previously noted, this can be a long and expensive process with
an uncertain outcome. Third, it can look to developing new sources of
water, either from groundwater or water storage projects.95 Groundwater
is not always available and may not be a secure, long-term resource.96
TRANSACTION REVIEW 16 (2010). In Texas, rights to the Edwards Aquifer sold for $5,400 –
$6,500/AF. Id. Non-irrigation rights in Arizona sold for $1,000–$2,000/AF. Id. Prices in the
Mojave River Basin of California ranged from $400–$3,841. Id. CBT units are converted to
acre feet using a quota set each year by the NCWCD. The quota was 80% in 2007 and 2009,
and 70% in 2008. See generally News Releases, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dis-
trict, http://www.northernwater.org/MediaAndNews/NewsReleases.aspx. See infra text
accompanying notes 191–197 explaining the CBT quota system. R
93. See KENNEY, MAZZONE & BEDINGFIELD, supra note 36 (comparing costs of conserva- R
tion programs, water transfers and water development projects). Study finds that conserva-
tion is the cheapest option. Id. at 5.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31. See also KENNEY, MAZZONE & BED- R
INGFIELD, supra note 36, at 2 (assessing the relative costs of water transfers to other water R
supply options).
95. Both groundwater and storage projects have found little success in the past 20
years. See generally Nichols & Kenney, supra note 25, at 427; see, e.g., Am. Water Dev., Inc., v. R
City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 358-59 (Colo. 1994) (American Water Development, Inc., was
defeated in its attempt to tap and export 200,000 acre-feet of groundwater from beneath
land it owned in the San Luis Valley as it was determined to be tributary groundwater).
Additionally, new development of water storage projects is considered by most commenta-
tors to be nearly impossible because of environmental and area-of-origin considerations.
See, e.g., Nichols & Kenney, supra note 25, at 447 (claiming that any new development will R
be small scale and “unconventional” reservoirs).
96. Although most groundwater aquifers do have a certain level of recharge or replen-
ishment, the rate is markedly slow, and therefore, groundwater resources are usually con-
sidered non-renewable. See, e.g., Stephen Foster et al., Utilization of Non-Renewable
Groundwater: A Socially-Sustainable Approach to Resource Management, in SUSTAINABLE
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND TOOLS, Briefing Note 11 (2002), available at
cap-net.org/sites/cap-net.org/files/wtr_mngmnt_tls/38_GWMate11.pdf; see also PETER D.
NICHOLS, MEGAN K. MURPHY & DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, WATER AND GROWTH IN COLORADO: A
REVIEW OF LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 99, 103 (2001) (explaining that in Colorado, tributary
groundwater is treated like surface waters under the prior appropriation system and that
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Moreover, much groundwater is hydrologically connected to surface
water and thus often leads to conflicts with senior surface water users.97
Water storage, often with water from remote water basins, has
historically proved to be a reliable source for new water resources. How-
ever, stored water can also be very expensive. To justify construction of
new projects, a city typically compares the cost of building and operating
the project to other options, including the costs associated with buying,
transferring, and delivering water from existing users.98 If the cost of
transferring water is inflated well beyond the true market price, water
development looks far more reasonable.99
Suppose, for example, that a city decides it needs to secure an
additional 10,000 acre-feet of water to satisfy its projected demands. If
the price for water in a dysfunctional market is currently $10,000/acre-
foot (including delivery costs) then, assuming that operation and mainte-
nance costs are comparable, the city will likely opt to transfer water
rights only if the cost of a project to produce that water is more than $100
million—the cost of purchasing and transferring 10,000 acre-feet of water
rights. If the true market price for water, however, is $1,000 per acre-foot,
then the city would be justified in pursuing the project only if the project
could be built for less than $10 million.100 Perhaps more importantly, if
the city is not sure how much water it will get from the proposed trans-
fer, or how long it will take to consummate the transfer, the city might
non-tributary groundwater can only be permanent source of water supply if withdrawals
are limited to the recharge rate).
97. See, e.g., Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 357, 359, 368 (Colo.
1994); Kobobel v. State, 249 P.3d 1127, 1136 (Colo. 2011); Three Bells Ranch Associates v.
Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass’n, 758 P.2d 164, 169–70 (Colo. 1988).
98. E.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, OMAHA DIST., supra note 67, at ES-3. R
99. Nichols & Kenney, supra note 25, at 421–22. (“[M]unicipalities such as Colorado R
Springs, Pueblo, Pueblo West, and Aurora now own almost all of the water from the Twin
Lakes project located south of Leadville, a trans-basin project originally designed to serve
irrigation interests. Shares sell for $10,000 to $15,000, a price dramatically higher than the
cost of native Arkansas River water. Yet, buying shares of trans-basin water for municipal
use makes better economic sense than buying native water since it is generally possible to
unilaterally change the use without the uncertainty or risk of water court. C-BT shares
exhibit a similar trend. Municipal water providers concerned about water court costs to
convert native water dramatically bid up the price of C-BT units. Weighted C-BT prices
rose steadily from around $3,600 per acre-foot in June 1996 to nearly $26,000 per acre-foot
in April 2000. In contrast, competing native irrigation water sells for $500 to $1,000 per
acre-foot, depending on location.”).
100. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, OMAHA DIST., supra note 67, at ES-7. No R
action alternative which would involve acquiring the water from CBT would cost an esti-
mated $830,500,000. This is significantly more than the other proposed alternatives, all of
which involve major water development projects. Id.
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reasonably opt to build the project even if it is projected to cost more due
to the uncertainties surrounding the transfer.
While water transfers can have adverse environmental impacts,101
limiting transfers to the existing consumptive use (i.e., the amount that
has historically been consumed by the existing user), and restricting
transfers to the basin of origin, would largely guarantee relatively mod-
est environmental impacts. By contrast, water development projects—
especially those that draw water from remote water basins—are far more
likely to impose serious environmental damage.102 The costs and benefits
associated with the projects may justify these damages as compared to
the alternatives. But when the water transfer alternative is based upon
the significantly inflated costs of a dysfunctional market, environmental-
ists and economic conservatives alike can fairly question whether a more
rational approach to water transfers should be fashioned. Suggestions for
reforming current law and practices to overcome the problems identified
in this section are set out in a later section of this article.103 Suffice to say
that relatively minor changes to existing law could correct some of the
most troubling flaws in the current system and help to promote a truly
free and flourishing water market.
One additional, but important, advantage of defining water rights
in terms of consumptive use is the fundamental way that it changes in-
centives for farmers. Under current law, a farmer’s incentive is to grow
the most water consumptive crop possible, especially if that farmer is
even remotely contemplating a possible future transfer of the water
right. This is because the transfer amount will likely be limited to the
amount of water historically consumed.104 If however, a water right is
defined in terms of its consumptive use, the farmer has the opposite
incentive.
Consider, for example, a farmer who has historically grown alfalfa
on 100 acres of land. That farmer would typically consume about 193
acre-feet of water in northeastern Colorado.105 If the law defined that
farmer’s water right as the full 193 acre-feet of water consumed by the
alfalfa crop, that farmer would have a powerful incentive to switch to a
101. E.g., Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water Transfers: Implications for
Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 13 (1995)(explaining environmental impacts of
California’s water banks).
102. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, OMAHA DIST., MOFFAT COLLECTION SYSTEM
PROJECT (MOFFAT PROJECT) DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Oct. 2009); U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, OMAHA DIST., supra note 67. R
103. See infra Part VI.
104. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104(a) (current through July 15, 2012); see also Orr
v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1223–24 (Colo. 1988).
105. SAVE THE POUDRE COAL., supra note 82. See also FRANK & CARLSON, supra note 83. R
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less water intensive crop so as to be able to sell the remaining right.
Growing sunflowers, for example, in northeastern Colorado would con-
sume about 134 acre-feet of water.106 Thus, the farmer could continue to
farm, albeit with a different crop, while at the same time realizing a sig-
nificant profit from selling the water saved as a result of the crop switch.
V. Case Studies of Water Transfers
To better understand how water transfers happen, a review of
projects that facilitate or are designed to facilitate transfers will be useful.
These projects both inform the possibilities for water transfers and point
to some of the obstacles that still remain. Two particular projects receive
special attention here. The first looks at a single special purpose dis-
trict—the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD)—
and its program for moving water simply and efficiently among the
many prospective users in a large geographic area encompassing most of
northeastern Colorado. This is not the first such study of this District,107
and it will undoubtedly not be the last. This study is unique, however, in
highlighting features of the NCWCD that promote the easy movement of
water. It also examines some of the ways in which the operation of the
District could further be improved to facilitate the movement of water.
The second case study examines the “Super Ditch Company” proposal
that would essentially combine several ditch companies in the Arkansas
River valley for the purposes of promoting agricultural to urban water
transfers in a way that keeps rural areas in control of the water rights
and thus protects rural interests.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., DANIEL TYLER, THE LAST WATER HOLE IN THE WEST: THE COLORADO-BIG
THOMPSON PROJECT AND THE NORTHERN COLORADO WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT (1992);
David S. Brookshire et al., Market Prices for Water in the Semiarid West of the United States, 40
WATER RES., July 29, 2004, at 1; Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in
Water: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado–Big Thompson
Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283 (2001); Raymond L. Anderson, Windfall Gains from Trans-
fer of Water Allotments within the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, 43 LAND ECON. 265 (1967);
Charles W. Howe, Project Benefits and Costs from National and Regional Viewpoints: Method-
ological Issues and Case Study of the Colorado–Big Thompson Project, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 5
(1987); Saliba et al., supra note 25, at 631; Charles W. Howe et al., Innovations in Water Man- R
agement: Lessons from the Colorado-Big Thompson Project and Northern Colorado Water Conser-
vancy District, in SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 171 (1986); Charles W. Howe
et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential for Water Markets, 22 WATER
RESOURCES RES., Apr. 1986, at 439; HARTMAN & SEASTONE, supra note 61, at 45. R
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A. The Colorado-Big Thompson Project
The story of the Colorado Big Thompson (CBT) project and its
remarkable success in achieving a robust market for its water resources
dates back to 1870, even before Colorado became a state. Two thousand
settlers established the Union Colony at what is now Greeley,108 irrigat-
ing 12,000 acres, and taking appropriated water directly from the South
Platte River.109 By 1900, Union Colony and other landowners in the re-
gion had already over-appropriated the water in the streams.110 If agri-
culture in the region was to continue to grow, water would need to come
from across the Great Divide.111
In the 1920s, as annual crop losses mounted due to inadequate
native water supplies, individual farmers and mutual irrigation compa-
nies sought government support to secure more reliable sources of irri-
gation water.112 In 1929, the Colorado State Engineer, the Platte Valley
Water Conservation League, and the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers sponsored a study that found that the water resources in the South
Platte Basin were insufficient to meet the current and future supply de-
mands for Northeastern Colorado.113 However, the study identified a po-
tential surplus of water on the western side of the Continental Divide,
within the headwaters of the Colorado River.114 In 1935, the United States
Bureau of Reclamation began surveying the Colorado River Basin to de-
termine the feasibility of a west-to-east trans-mountain water diversion,
as well as the potential impact that such a diversion might have on fu-
ture development on the Western Slope.115 In 1937 Congress approved
construction of the trans-mountain water diversion and supply project,
known as the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT).116
The project’s approval was contingent upon the formation of a
public water district in Colorado to contract with the United States gov-
ernment for repayment of the project costs.117 Later in 1937, the same
108. ROBERT AUTOBEE, COLORADO–BIG THOMPSON PROJECT 3 (1996), available at http://
www.usbr.gov/projects//ImageServer?imgName=Doc_1303159857902.pdf.
109. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado–Big Thompson Project, Development,
USBR.GOV, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thomp-
son+Project (last updated July 23, 2012).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Interior Department Appropriation Act, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-249, 50 Stat. 564, 595
(1937).
117. AUTOBEE, supra note 108, at 11. R
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year that Congress authorized the CBT project, the Colorado Legislature
enacted the Colorado Water Conservancy Act,118 which authorizes a dis-
trict court to organize a conservancy district upon petition of a stipulated
number of property owners.119 Landowners in Larimer, Boulder, Weld,
Morgan, Washington, Logan, and Sedgwick counties subsequently cre-
ated the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD) and
designated it as a public agency authorized to contract with the United
States for the development and management of the CBT system and its
water supply.120
According to the NCWCD Water Conservation and Management
Plan, “[t]he District’s primary purpose is to provide supplemental water
for agricultural, municipal, domestic, and industrial uses in northeastern
Colorado.”121 The NCWCD encompasses approximately 1.6 million acres
in portions of eight counties, with boundaries encompassing the majority
of irrigated land within the South Platte watershed downstream of Fort
Lupton.122 This area includes the principal tributary rivers of the Cache la
Poudre, the Big and Little Thompson, the St. Vrain, and Boulder Creek.123
NCWCD serves a population of approximately 830,000 and deliv-
ers an average of 213,000 acre-feet per year to more than 100 ditch, reser-
voir, and irrigation companies, and thirty-two municipalities.124 This
118. COL. REV. STAT. § 37-45-101 (1937).
119. Id. at §§108–109.
120. See NORTHERN WATER, WATER CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT PLAN 8 (2011)
[hereinafter NCWCD Management Plan], available at http://www.northernwater.org/
docs/WaterConservation/WaterConservationMngtPlan.pdf.
121. Id. at 9. “Through the C-BT Project, Northern Water helps administer the delivery
of an average of 215,000 acre-feet of Colorado River water annually to northeastern Colo-
rado for municipal, agricultural and industrial uses. The C-BT Project provides these addi-
tional water supplies to the region as a supplemental supply, not the sole source of water,
for water users.” Id.; see also U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado–Big Thompson Project,
Benefits, USBR.GOV, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+
Thompson+Project (last updated July 23, 2012) (“Eleven communities now receive full or
supplemental [use from the project].”); see also AUTOBEE, supra note 108, at 12 (“[The project] R
provide[s] water to existing farmlands and was not designed to reclaim uncultivated
land.”).
122. Northern Water, Water Projects, NORTHERNWATER.ORG, http://www.northernwater.
org/WaterProjects/WaterProjects.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
123. Northern Water, How the Colorado-Big Thompson Project Works, NORTHERNWATER.
ORG, http://www.northernwater.org/WaterProjects/HowtheC-BTWorks.aspx (last visited
Nov. 5, 2012).
124. The most recent yearly data from the NCWCD shows an annual use of 213,000
acre-feet. NORTHERN WATER, 2010 WATER QUALITY REPORT: FLOWING SITES EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY 4 (2010), available at http://www.northernwater.org/docs/WaterQuality/WQ_
Reports/2010WqRepExecSumm.pdf. The NCWCD Management Plan found in 2011 that
the project had delivered an annual average of 215,000 acre-feet per year to the service area.
NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 120, at 9. R
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amounts to about 10 percent of the total water used within the
NCWCD’s service area annually.125
As noted previously, Congress mandated the establishment of the
NCWCD essentially to manage the CBT project. The project consists of a
collection and distribution system encompassing 12 reservoirs, 35 miles
of tunnels, and 95 miles of canals.126 Within the Colorado River Basin on
Colorado’s Western Slope, Willow Creek and Shadow Mountain Reser-
voirs, along with Grand Lake and Lake Granby collect and store water
for the CBT system.127 A series of pumps move water up from Lake
Granby to Shadow Mountain Reservoir, which then flows into Grand
Lake.128 From there, the 13.1 miles long Alva B. Adams Tunnel carries
Colorado River water under the Continental Divide to tunnels, canals,
and pipelines that divert and disperse the water to users throughout
northeastern Colorado.129 A number of reservoirs store the CBT flows on
the Eastern Slope, and the system forks to the north and south, tying
distribution into South Platte River tributaries from the Cache la Poudre
River to Boulder Creek.130
The significant hydroelectric power revenues that the CBT project
generates contribute substantially to the economic feasibility of the water
transfers system.131 After it crosses the Continental Divide, CBT water
generates hydroelectric power at five stations as it descends nearly one-
half mile before meeting its first tributary, the Big Thompson River.132
Seven hundred miles of transmission lines within the CBT system trans-
port this generated power to various substations.133 CBT generates an av-
erage of 760 million kilowatt-hours on an annual basis, with all power
125. Between 1957–2003 the CBT Project annually provided 221,381 acre-feet of water to
water users within
NCWCD’s boundaries. See NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 120, Table 9, Appendix R
G. Therefore, CBT water only made up 10% of all the water used within the District bound-
aries (2,232,757 acre-feet annually). Id. Of the 2,232,757 acre-feet of water used within the
District annually, 657,595 acre-feet are pumped from wells. Id.
126. Northern Water C-BT, NORTHERN Colorado Water Conservancy District, http://
www.northernwater.org/WaterProjects/CBTProject.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See United States Bureau of Reclamation, Project Details – Colorado-Big Thompson
Project – Facility Descriptions [hereinafter Project Details – CBT], USBR.GOV, http://www.
usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project (last visited
Nov. 5, 2011).
131. See AUTOBEE, supra note 108, at 12, 28. R
132. See Project Details – CBT, supra note 130. R
133. See AUTOBEE, supra note 108, at 28. R
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revenues held by the United States through the Department of Energy’s
Western Area Power Administration and the Bureau of Reclamation.134
The CBT system has a total storage capacity of 925,456 acre-feet,
with the majority of its Western Slope capacity held within Lake Granby
(539,758 acre-feet), and the Front Range capacity primarily coming from
Horsetooth Reservoir (156,735 acre-feet) and Carter Lake (112,230 acre-
feet).135 With 75,000 acre-feet of dead storage, Lake Granby can hold over
two years of CBT water in active storage.136 CBT water rights are owned
by the Bureau of Reclamation and the water is sold to the District under
the terms of the Repayment Contract (Contract).137
Perhaps the most unique feature of the CBT project—and most
relevant to this study—is that CBT water rights are represented by
310,000 shares or units.138 Each share was supposed to represent an acre-
foot of water to account for the 310,000 acre-feet of West Slope water that
the project was designed to deliver.139 On average, however, the CBT
project only provides about 220,000 acre-feet annually to its sharehold-
ers, thus yielding an average of 0.7 acre-feet for each CBT share each
year.140 What makes this project so important for the study of water
transfers is that the 310,000 CBT shares are freely marketable over the
entire District—a vast geographic area that includes all of the urban ar-
eas along the Front Range of Colorado from Broomfield to Fort Collins.141
134. Id.; see also Contract between the U.S. and the Northern Colorado Water Conser-
vancy District Providing for the Construction of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, 5 Jul.
1938, ¶ 18, at 24–25 [hereinafter Repayment Contract].
135. Northern Colorado Water Conservation District, Colorado-Big Thompson Interpretive
Area Brochure, available at http://www.northernwater.org/docs/WaterConservation/CBT_
InterpretiveArea.pdf.
136. See United States Geological Survey, 09018500 Lake Granby Near Granby, CO,
PUBS.USGS.GOV, http://pubs.usgs.gov/wdr/wdr-co-03-1/vol2/html/09018500.2003.sw.
html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); see also Interview with Don Carlson and Brian Werner,
NCWCD, in Berthoud, Colo. (July 17, 2009) (“Dead Storage” is defined as water storage
space below the level of the spillway). [hereinafter Interview with Carlson & Werner].
137. See RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 135 (1989); see also Repayment Contract, supra note 134. R
138. See D.M. Frick & J.D. Salas, Evaluating Modelling [sic] Strategies for a Complex Water
Resource, in IAHS Pub. No. 201 (1991), available at http://iahs.info/redbooks/a201/iahs_
201_0105.pdf.
139. Repayment Contract, supra note 134,¶ 4, at 8. R
140. E.g., CBT shares were originally set at 0.6 for 2009 but were raised to 0.8 in April of
that year and remained at 0.8 through the end of the water year in October. See Press
Release, Brian Werner, Northern Water Waternews (April 10, 2009), available at http://
www.northernwater.org/docs/Previous_News_Releases/2009_4_10_quota_set.pdf.
141. For a description of the geographic area encompassed by the District, see NCWCD
Management Plan, supra note 120, at 8. R
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The primary documents that guide management of the CBT sys-
tem and its water are the Colorado Water Conservancy Act,142 Senate
Document 80,143 and the Repayment Contract with the United States.144
Colorado’s Water Conservancy Act provides the underlying legal au-
thority for establishing water conservancy districts within the state.145
Among the powers granted under the Act is the power to fix an ad
valorem tax of up to one mill on all property within the District.146 As
required by the terms of the Contract, the District levies the full one mill
tax on all property within its boundaries,147 and that tax generates a large
portion of the District’s annual revenue.148
Senate Document 80 contains a detailed proposal and cost esti-
mate for the CBT project as presented to the United States Senate.149 The
document, dated June 11, 1937, describes the reservoirs, pipelines, power
plants, dams, and other structures that were to be built and implemented
as part of the CBT delivery system.150 Senate Document 80 describes
three purposes for the CBT project: (1) to preserve the vested and future
water rights in irrigation; (2) to conserve and make use of these waters
for irrigation, power, industrial development, and other purposes; and
(3) to maintain conditions of river flow for the benefit of domestic and
sanitary uses of this water.151
142. COLO. REV. STAT. §37-45-101 to 153 (2010).
143. Senate Document 80 was the Bureau of Reclamation’s final report on the develop-
ment and cost estimate of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. Senate Document 80 also
included letters of support from the primary groups representing water interests on the
east and west sides of the project. After its acceptance by the U.S. Senate, Senate Document
80 “became the governing authority for construction and maintenance of the CBT system.”
See TYLER, supra note 107, at 82. R
144. NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 120, at 49. R
145. COLO. REV. STAT. §37-45-102(1)(a) (2011); The Colorado Supreme Court has held
that a water conservancy district is a de facto municipal corporation with the power to levy
taxes, People ex rel. Dunbar v. South Platte Water Conservancy District, 364 P.2d 215, 217
(Colo. 1961).
146. COLO. REV. STAT. §37-45-122(1) (2011); The statute also allows for water districts to
build and operate water works, exercise eminent domain, and many other powers enumer-
ated in § 37-45-118.
147. One mill equals $.001. The District’s practices were confirmed in an interview with
Don Carlson and Brian Werner, NCWCD, in Berthoud, Colo. (July 17, 2009); see also Repay-
ment Contract, supra note 134 ¶15, at 21. R
148. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District Fund, 2010 Estimated Budget D1,
available at http://www.northernwater.org/docs/About_Us/Budgets/NW_budgets_2009_
2010.pdf, (last visited Nov. 5, 2012)(the tax accounts for around $14 million of approxi-
mately $28 million in total revenue, a larger portion than any other source).
149. See TYLER, supra note 107, at 82. R
150. NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 120, at 17. R
151. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Water Conservation and Manage-
ment Plan 3 (2004); Id.
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The Contract set out the terms and conditions for CBT project con-
struction, management of project works and water resources, and cost
allocation between the United States and the District for CBT construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance.152 According to the Contract, “[t]he
terms and conditions of the Repayment Contract dictate the use of CBT
project water.”153
The Contract also included a detailed but tentative list of major
project works, such as CBT reservoirs, dams and hydroelectric power
plants, canals, pumping plants, transmission lines, and the trans-moun-
tain diversion tunnel.154 It estimated that the cost of construction for the
CBT project would be $44 million, but provided that “the total obligation
of the District under this contract for construction shall in no event ex-
ceed $25,000,000,” or about 57 percent of the estimated cost.155 The re-
ported final CBT project construction cost ballooned to $163 million
(including power station construction costs),156 thus reducing the Dis-
trict’s share, which remained at $25,000,000, to less than 15 percent, even
without taking into account the substantial value of the long-term, inter-
est-free loan.157 In 2006, the United States Congress adopted a resolution
recognizing that the District’s responsibility for payment had been ful-
filled, but allowing for continuation of all other terms of the Contract.158
The Contract allocates possession, operation, maintenance, and
costs related to project works.159 The United States is responsible for
power plants and associated works, while the District manages the vari-
152. Repayment Contract, supra note 134 ¶1, at 1. (providing management terms for the R
CBT system). See also Jean Marie Boyer & Christine Hawley, Operational and Water Quality
Summary Report for Grand Lake and Shadow Mountain Reservoir 5-6 (2010) (suggesting five
“primary” purposes for the CBT project, two of which concern the protection of Grand
Lake and its resources), available at, http://www.northernwater.org/docs/WaterQuality/
WQ_Reports/2010ClarityRepGrandLake.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
153. See id.
154. Id. ¶4, at 2-7.
155. Id. ¶5, at 9.
156. Charles H. Howe, Project Benefits and Costs from National and Regional Viewpoints:
Methodological Issues and Case Study of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, 26 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 77, 84 (1986).
157. The Repayment Contract makes clear that the District’s share was to be paid out in
forty consecutive annual installments with no interest. Repayment Contract, supra note 134 R
¶6, at 10; see also Tyler, supra note 107. The District also paid Grand County “the sum of R
$100,000.00, to compensate such County for loss due to the construction of the project. . ..”
Repayment Contract, supra note 134 ¶7, at 12. Regarding subsidies generally available under R
the Reclamation Act, see RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 27–28 (1989).
158. H.R. 3443,109th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2006).
159. Repayment Contract, supra note 134. R
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ous canals and pumping plants.160 All revenues generated from the
power plants within the CBT system (excluding revenue from water re-
leases at Green Mountain Reservoir161) go to the United States.162
The Contract also specifies revenues to be collected by the District,
including CBT water rental rates and property taxes.163 In order to make
its repayments to the United States, “the District shall exercise its full
powers under the Water Conservancy District Act of Colorado to pro-
duce the funds necessary to meet in full its obligations under this con-
tract.”164 Water rental prices are to be “approved by the Secretary, but in
no event less than $1.50 per acre-foot per annum.”165 Based on the taxa-
tion power granted under the Water Conservancy Act,166 the Contract
requires that “the District shall levy not less than one-mill tax on prop-
erty within the District” annually.167 Property taxes currently comprise
about one half of all District revenues.168
Article 16 of the Contract lays out the terms of the District’s “per-
petual rights to use all water . . . that becomes available through the
construction and operation of this project, for irrigation, domestic, mu-
nicipal, and industrial purposes. . ..”169 Use of the water by the District
for any power-generating purposes is prohibited.170 The Contract also al-
160. H.R. 3443, supra note 158, ¶¶8–9, at 12–16. R
161. See Repayment Contract, supra note 134 ¶22, at 28. These revenues shall be dis- R
posed of pursuant to Article 22, which states:
Miscellaneous revenues arising out of use of project works facilities and
other properties. . .shall be credited to the cost of construction of the pro-
ject until such times as the final determination of construction costs has
been made by the Secretary. . .and thereafter shall be credited equally to
the District and the United States; provided, however, that all revenues
derived from the carriage of other than project water through the Conti-
nental Divide Tunnel shall be the property of the District.
162. See id. ¶18, at 24–25.
163. Id. ¶15, at 22.
164. Id.
165. See id. Northern Water C-BT, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
http://www.northernwater.org/WaterProjects/CBTProject.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2012)
¶10, at 17.
166. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-121, 122(1) (2011).
167. Repayment Contract, supra note 134, ¶ 15 at 21. R
168. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Comprehensive Annual Financial
Report 3 (2009), available at http://www.northernwater.org/docs/annual_reports_nw_
FINANCIAL/cafr09.pdf.
169. Repayment Contract, supra note 134, ¶ 16, at 23. These rights exclude “water made R
available by the Green Mountain Reservoir, (reserved for West Slope use as compensation
for Colorado River water diverted out of basin by the CBT project) and the water rights
reserved in Article 24 (a maximum of “three second-feet”) for use in Rocky Mountain Na-
tional Park], and in Article 25 (up to 500 acre feet per year for Estes Park). Id. ¶¶ 16, 24–25.
170. Id. ¶ 16, at 23.
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lows the United States to demand a minimum annual flow of 255,000
acre-feet through the Alva B. Adams Tunnel for hydroelectric power
generation.171
CBT water is imported into the South Platte Basin from the Colo-
rado Basin and is therefore foreign water.172 Under Colorado law, “. . .a
developer of foreign water has the right to use, reuse, successively use,
and dispose of such water. . . subject to contractual obligations.”173 The Con-
tract effectively took away this significant advantage for foreign water by
prohibiting a shareholder’s reuse of CBT water.174 Specifically, the Con-
tract requires the District to reallocate return flows as a supplemental
supply for downstream irrigation users within the District, free of
charge.175 This is sometimes described as the “Return Flow Policy.”176 The
District is currently in the process of quantifying CBT return flows
171. Id. In addition, the contract requires that the distribution and use of water by the
District comply with the Reclamation Act, and Section 13 of the Boulder Canyon Project
Act, which control the use and sale of public land for irrigation purposes.
172. This water is considered “foreign water” because it is water that is imported into a
new stream system. See e.g., 32A COLO. PRAC., METHODS OF PRACTICE § 76.10 (5th ed.); see
also PETER D. NICHOLS, MEGAN K. MURPHY & DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, WATER AND GROWTH IN
COLORADO: A REVIEW OF LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 39 (2001).
173. Town of Estes Park v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 677 P.2d 320, 326
(Colo.1984) (emphasis added).
174. TYLER, supra note 107, at 462. Article 19 of the Repayment Contract, provides in R
relevant part as follows:
There is also claimed and reserved by the United States for the use of the District
for domestic, irrigation and industrial uses, all of the increment, seepage and re-
turn flow water which may result from the construction of the project and
the importation thereby, from an extraneous source, to-wit, from the Colo-
rado River watershed, of a new and added supply of water to average
320,000 acre feet, or more, annually, into the streams of the South Platte
watershed from which the irrigable lands within the District derive their
water supply; and the right is reserved on behalf of the District to capture,
recapture, use and reuse the said added supply so often and as it may appear at
the stream intake headgates of ditches and reservoirs serving lands within
the District. Said captured, recaptured and return flow water shall be, by the
Board of Directors of the District, allocated only to the irrigable lands within the
District already being partially supplied with water for irrigation, using as a
basis for such allocation the decreed priorities existing at the date of this
contract, and without other or additional consideration or payments by the own-
ers of such lands therefore; provided no such captured, recaptured or return
flow water shall be taken and held as supplying any appropriation or de-
creed priority of any such ditch or reservoir.
Repayment Contract, supra note 134, ¶ 19, at 25–26 (emphasis added). R
175. See Carey & Sunding, supra note 107, at 324. R
176. Interview with Carlson & Werner, supra note 136. R
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through a modeling project, with the goal of gathering information to
better manage this water supply.177
Given the value of CBT water (currently more than $8,500/acre-
foot) the decision to allocate return flows to secondary users without
charge seems surprising.178 Perhaps it is, as the Colorado Supreme Court
has suggested, that “return flow rights were critical to the organizational
and operational scheme of the district.”179 Indeed, return flows are the
only benefit to the landowners in the eastern portion of the District along
the South Platte River, who pay the District’s ad valorem tax.180 The Re-
turn Flow Policy has also been defended on the grounds that it protects
Denver Water and other native South Platte water users because CBT
return flows help satisfy senior appropriators along the South Platte and
in the eastern portion of the District.181 Were it not for return flows, these
seniors might otherwise call out more junior South Platte water rights.182
While this rationale is no doubt true, it is far from clear why the
NCWCD should operate its project to benefit users outside the District at
the expense of its own CBT shareholders.
Others have argued that the primary reason for the District retain-
ing return flow rights is to prevent any future federal interference in
these state water supplies, while also reducing transaction costs of CBT
water.183 This latter benefit may result from attempts by the District to
avoid complaints by downstream irrigators who could allege interfer-
ence with their water rights if CBT shareholders were allowed to reuse
their water or increase the consumption of the water they currently
use.184
CBT water is distributed to participants based on the number of
units or shares of water owned by each account holder.185 Each share-
holder has a delivery contract with the District, giving them a perpetual
177. Id.
178. In 2010, CBT water sold for as much as $9,000/acre-foot, 24 WATER STRATEGIST 11,
5, Nov. 2010, but CBT water has sold for as much $15,000/acre-foot in the past, Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District. Water records, on file with author.
179. See Town of Estes Park v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 677 P.2d 320,
326 (Colo. 1984).
180. It is unlikely, however, that the taxes generated by these landowners are remotely
equivalent to the value of these return flows, and from a purely economic perspective it
would probably have made more sense to remove these lands from the District.
181. NICHOLS ET AL., supra note 172. R
182. Id. (citing interview with Lee Rozaklis, Jul. 20, 1999).
183. Carey & Sunding, supra note 107, at 304–05, 323–24. R
184. Megan Hennessy, Colorado River Water Rights: Property Rights in Transition, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1661, 1669 (2004).
185. N. COLO. WATER CONSERVANCY DIST., CBT PROJECT QUOTA, available at http://
www.northernwater.org/AllotteeInformation/CBTQuota.aspx.
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right to use of the water supply, subject to annual payments to the Dis-
trict.186 The District charges a delivery fee for each unit delivered, which
can be modified on an annual basis.187 This fee is currently $10 per unit
delivered to agricultural allottees and $24 per unit delivered to munici-
palities.188 Municipalities hold approximately 65 percent of the current
CBT shares but lease many of their units to agricultural users.189 The mu-
nicipal shareholders with the largest CBT allotments are among the most
populous cities on the Front Range—Greeley, Boulder, and Fort
Collins.190
As noted previously, CBT water is represented by 310,000 shares
or units. The per-unit yield in any given year is determined by a quota
system that is set annually by the District’s Board of Directors.191 In set-
ting the initial quota each October, and resetting the following April, the
Board takes into account water availability and need in the region.192
Since CBT water is designed as a supplemental water supply, the Board
looks at native water supplies and local storage during the quota setting
process.193 The goal of the process is to set a quota that leads to a stable
average water supply from year to year.194 Therefore, CBT quotas in wet
years are typically lower than the quotas set in drier years because native
supplies in wet years satisfy a greater percentage of water demand
within the District.195 The historic average quota is approximately 0.7
acre feet per unit, but this amount varies.196 During the course of delivery
of CBT water, seepage and evaporation (operational losses) historically
account for losses of 4% on average.197
186. Repayment Contract, supra note 134, ¶ 16, at 23. R
187. Assessments, NORTHERN WATER, available at http://www.northernwater.org/Allot-
teeInformation/Assessments.aspx (last visited Nov. 25, 2012).
188. Interview with Carlson & Werner, supra note 136. R
189. Id.
190. N. COLO. WATER CONSERVANCY DIST., COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FINANCIAL REP. 48
(2008), available at http://www.northernwater.org/docs/annual_reports_nw_FINANCIAL
/cafr08.pdf [hereinafter ANN. FINANCIAL REP.].
191. Water Market Indicators: Colorado-Big Thompson Units, 23 WATER STRATEGIST 1, Jan.
2009.
192. Id.
193. NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 120, at 9, 18. R
194. Id. at 18.
195. CLEAR WATER SOLUTIONS, INC., CITY OF EVANS: 2009 WATER CONSERVATION PLAN 9
(2009), available at http://cwcbweblink.state.co.us/WebLink/ElectronicFile.aspx?docid=132543&&
dbid=0.
196. See, e.g., Press Release, Northern Water Waternews, supra note 140. R
197. Water Conservation and Management Plan 3, supra note 151, Appendix G, Table 2 R
(2004).
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The Board also approves any transactions and transfers of CBT
units, subject to the conditions set by District policies.198 Transactions oc-
cur wholly within the NCWCD, so approval by the Colorado water court
is not required.199 CBT transfers are relatively straightforward, inexpen-
sive, and require little time (two to three months) in comparison to typi-
cal water transfers.200 When CBT water applications were first accepted
in 1937–38, the original cost was $1.50/unit.201 As late as 1988, the aver-
age sale price for CBT units was still well below $1,000/unit, but unit
prices spiked to as much as $15,000/unit before settling back down to
the $8,000–$10,000 range.202
While CBT water is expensive, it is relatively easy to acquire
rights quickly.203 But even accounting for this convenience, CBT unit
prices are still significantly higher than water rights in most other
states.204 District officials attribute this premium to the limited supply of
CBT units and the fact that storage costs are built into each CBT share.205
In the early years of CBT water distribution, agricultural usage
dominated CBT water deliveries, topping out at 99.04 percent in 1958.206
Municipal and industrial usage has gradually increased since 1958, and
66 percent of CBT units are now owned by municipal and industrial
198. NORTHERN COLORADO WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, ALLOTMENT CONTRACT INFO,
available at http://www.northernwater.org/AllotteeInformation/AllotmentContracts.aspx.
199. Id.
200. W.L. Nieuwoudt, Water Market Institutions in Colorado with Possible Lessons for South
Africa, 26 WATER SA 27, 30 (2000).
201. Brookshire et al., supra note 66, at 3.
202. ANN. FINANCIAL REP., supra note 190, at 67. CBT shares sold for this price as re- R
cently as November 2010. 24 WATER STRATEGIST 10, Nov. 2010.
203. Interview with Carlson & Werner, supra note 136. In December 2008, CBT units R
sold at a price of $9,300/unit, when the quota set at that time yielded 0.6 acre feet per unit,
Transactions: Colorado, 23 WATER STRATEGIST 1, Jan. 2009. From 2002 to 2008, CBT unit prices
have fluctuated between approximately $9,300–10,600/unit, Water Market Indicators: Colo-
rado-Big Thompson Units, 23 WATER STRATEGIST 11,12, Nov., Dec. 2009.
204. See 2009 ANNUAL TRANSACTION REVIEW, supra note 90. California has some of the R
highest prices per unit of water with shares of the San Antonio Water District selling at
$48,000 per share as recently as December 2009. It should be noted that these shares pro-
vide 2.59 acre feet per share per year, which is nearly three times the amount of water in
CBT shares. See id. California water rights typically sell for slightly less than CBT shares;
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California purchased water rights in December
2010 for $7,900 per acre foot; The Tejon Ranch Company bought water rights in the same
month for $5,850 per acre foot, 24 WATER STRATEGIST 11, Dec. 2010; Arizona has seen com-
parable prices in non-water district shares over recent years, an unnamed golf course
bought 98 acre feet of water at $1,500 per acre foot in February 2009, 23 WATER STRATEGIST
2, Feb. 2009.
205. Interview with Carlson & Werner, supra note 136. R
206. Water Conservation and Management Plan 3, supra note 151, Appendix F (2004). R
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users.207 However, approximately 60 percent of the actual deliveries still
go to agriculture.208 The municipalities have purchased CBT units in an-
ticipation of future needs but currently do not have demand for the
amount of water to which they have right.209 This allows irrigators to
lease water from municipal shareholders throughout the drier months.210
The hallmark of the CBT project is the ease with which shares are
bought and sold and the range of uses for which they are approved. At
least a part of its success is no doubt related to the district’s geography,
which allows easy delivery of project water to most of the cities along the
northern Front Range of Colorado. Moreover, no two projects are the
same. Still, it is difficult to understand why other districts have not
adopted marketing mechanisms like the one established for the CBT. The
prospects for such reforms are explored in greater detail in Section VI.
B. The “Super Ditch” Proposal211
The “Super Ditch” proposal, as it is often called, is neither a ditch
nor any other kind of engineering project. Rather, it is essentially a
“Super Ditch Company” that would work by pooling the water resources
of seven ditch companies operating in the Arkansas River Basin of Colo-
rado. The Company would arrange with individual shareholders of the
seven ditch companies to lease water to municipal water suppliers pri-
marily through a system of “rotational fallowing”212 of agricultural land.
The most salient feature of this Super Ditch proposal is its mechanism for
allowing agricultural sellers to maintain control over water rights, even
as the water is made available for municipal use.
207. Telephone Interview with Sherri Rasmussen, Allotment Contract Specialist, N.
Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. (July 6, 2012).
208. NCWCD Delivery Database, CBT Project Deliveries (June 16, 2009) (on file with
author).
209. NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 120, at 54. R
210. See NCWCD Carryover Capacity Transferability Program Rule 3 (August 13, 2004),
available at http://www.northernwater.org/docs/AllotteeInfo/CarryovrCapacityTranfer
Prog.pdf.
211.  This section was adapted from a Report by Peter D. Nichols for the Colorado
Water Conservation Board titled: Development of Fallowing-Water Leasing in the Lower
Arkansas Valley (June 2011).
212. Rotational fallowing is a method of temporarily transferring water from agricul-
tural to municipal users in which a farmer will fallow a portion of their land and lease the
unused water to the municipality. The farmer will fallow a different portion of their land
every year to avoid permanently drying up any portion of their land. COLO. WATER CON-
SERVATION BD., ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL WATER TRANSFER METHODS GRANT PROGRAM
STUDY, 5 (May 2, 2011), available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/water-
supply-planning/Pages/main.aspx [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL TRANSFER
METHODS].
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The Arkansas River is the longest tributary in the Mississippi-Mis-
souri River System, flowing approximately 1,450 miles from its source
near Leadville, Colorado to the Mississippi River.213 Even though the Ar-
kansas River watershed is the largest in Colorado—covering nearly one-
third of the state’s surface area214—its annual average yield of water is
only about 6 percent of Colorado’s annual water supply.215
During the 1870s most of the irrigation in the Valley occurred
around the City of Pueblo and the majority of appropriations were rela-
tively small. In 1874, large-scale irrigation began in the Arkansas Valley
with the construction of the Rocky Ford Ditch by George Swink.216 Swink
successfully cultivated cantaloupe, watermelon, and sugar beets with the
careful use of irrigation.217 Sugar beet production, in particular, took hold
and supported the construction of Rocky Ford’s American Crystal Sugar
Company factory in 1900.218 Today, Rocky Ford’s appropriation is the
last in the Arkansas Valley to produce water reliably from the natural
flow of the River during the summer irrigation season.219
Irrigation continued to develop throughout the 1880s with the es-
tablishment of the Arkansas River Land Town and Canal Company in
1884.220 By 1893, T.C. Henry completed the Fort Lyon Canal from the site
of the Sand Creek Massacre to its junction with Big Sandy creek, totaling
110 miles.221 Private irrigation water supply companies became promi-
nent shortly thereafter, with investors expecting to recoup their profits
through shares of the company or lands made arable by the available
water.222 Often these private companies transformed into “mutual” com-
panies which were owned cooperatively by appropriators holding water
213. Arkansas River Historical Timeline, ARKANSAS RIVER HISTORICAL SOCIETY MUSEUM,
http://www.aopoa.net/history/history1.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
214. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., COLORADO’S WATER SUP-
PLY FUTURE: STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE 2010 4-3 (JANUARY 2011) (this projection
assumes a conservative amount of economic growth) [hereinafter SWSI 2010].
215. See David H. Getches, Meeting Colorado’s Water Requirements: An Overview of the
Issues, in TRADITION, INNOVATION, AND CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES ON COLORADO WATER LAW 1,
4 tbl.1 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell ed., 1986).
216. David W. Robbins & Dennis M. Montgomery, The Arkansas River Compact, 5 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 58, 62 (2001–2002).
217. LAWRENCE J. MacDonnell, FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER, AGRICUL-
TURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 24 (1999) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN
WEST].
218. Id.
219. Id. at 26.
220. Id. at 27.
221. Id. at 29.
222. Id. at 27–31.
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rights from the main ditch or canal.223 Today, approximately 20 major
ditch irrigation systems operate in the Colorado section of the Arkansas
River Valley.224 The largest, the Fort Lyon Canal, currently delivers water
to more than 90,000 acres on the north side of the Arkansas from La
Junta to Lamar.225
Extreme drought during 1889 and 1890 highlighted the need for
water storage within the Arkansas River Basin.226 Between 1890 and 1910
three reservoirs were constructed in the headwaters of the Basin and 11
more were constructed off-stream, adding 576,000 acre-feet of storage ca-
pacity to the system.227
Meanwhile, Sugar City grew around a factory built by the Na-
tional Beet Sugar Company that depended on sugar beet production
from the irrigation boom.228 Other beet-sugar factories were built in
Rocky Ford, Lamar, Holly, Swink, and Las Animas.229 By 1911, Sugar
City was the center of Colorado’s sugar industry and the local economy
was highly dependent on irrigation and water resources.230
Intense water development in the Colorado portion of the Arkan-
sas River Basin led Kansas to sue Colorado in the U.S. Supreme Court in
1901, seeking an order to prohibit Colorado from additional water devel-
opment there.231 The Court held that although Colorado’s development
caused “perceptible injury” to Kansas, the injury was not sufficient to
warrant the intervention of the Court.232 However, the Court made clear
that the time might come when “Kansas may justly say that there is no
longer an equitable division of benefits, and may rightfully call for
relief.”233
In an effort to stabilize water supplies in the Arkansas Basin, Con-
gress authorized construction of the John Martin Dam and Reservoir
223. In 1897 shareholders in the Fort Lyon Canal organized a nonprofit mutual corpora-
tion that is still in operation today. Id. at 30.
224. Robbins & Montgomery, supra note 216 at 62. R
225. Id. at 62–63.
226. See supra note 217, at 32.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 34
229. Id. at 34.
230. See id.
231. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). In its ruling, the Supreme Court devel-
oped the principle of “equitable apportionment” where “equality of right,” not equality of
amounts apportioned, should govern. Id. at 117. The Court explained that the states stand
“on the same level,” or “on an equal plane . . . in point of power and right, under our
constitutional system.” Thus, individual state laws do not bind the Court. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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project on the Arkansas River near Caddoa, Colorado in 1936.234 Thirteen
years later, Kansas and Colorado signed the Arkansas River Compact,
which establishes operating criteria for the John Martin Reservoir.235 In
1962, Congress authorized the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project which diverts
water across the Continental Divide from the Roaring Fork River, a trib-
utary of the Colorado River.236
Agricultural to urban water transfers from the Arkansas River
Valley to the Front Range became relatively common in the last half of
the 20th century as Colorado’s cities began to grow.237 The first transfer
occurred in 1955 when the city of Pueblo purchased the Clear Creek Res-
ervoir and its storage rights from the Otero Ditch Company.238 Pueblo
continued to obtain its water supply by trading diversion rights with the
Rocky Ford Highline Ditch Company in 1971, purchasing the Booth
Orchard Grove Ditch in 1972239 and 26 percent of the Bessemer Ditch in
2009.240
Private investors such as the Crowley Land and Development
Company (CLADCO) were also involved in agricultural to urban water
transactions.241 Shortly after the National Sugar Manufacturing Company
234. The John Martin Dam and reservoir were completed in 1943 by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. See The American West, supra note 217 at 39.
235. The Arkansas River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-69-101 to -106 (1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 82a-520 (1989) [hereinafter The Arkansas River Compact]. Under the terms of
the Compact, Colorado may demand releases of water equivalent to the river flow, but not
in excess of 100 cubic feet per second during the winter storage season (November 1 -
March 31)(COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-69-101 art. V, § A). During the summer storage season
(April 1 - October 31), Colorado may demand releases of water equivalent to the river flow
up to 500 cubic feet per second. Id. art. V, § B. Kansas may demand releases of water
equivalent to the portion of the river flow between 500 and 750 cubic feet per second. Id.
During the summer storage season, water being held in storage may be released upon
demand by both states concurrently or separately in amounts dependent upon the magni-
tude of the storage. With concurrent demand, Colorado is entitled to 60%, and Kansas 40%
of the 1000 cubic feet per second release Id. art. V, § C.
236. See Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, USBR.GOV, http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Project.
jsp?proj_Name=Fryingpan-Arkansas+Project. The Fryingpan-Arkansas annually diverts an
average of 69,200 acre-feet. Congress authorized the project under 87 Stat. 590 (1962); see
also http://www.secwcd.com/History and Description.htm.
237. See THE AMERICAN WEST, supra note 217, at 51.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 23 WATER STRATEGIST 10, 5 (November 2009). Additionally, Pueblo will have the
option to buy more shares in the Bessemer ditch as they are offered for sale. See also Alan
Hamel, Smooth Selling on the Bessemer Ditch: Pueblo Water Board’s Purchase Making Few Waves
One Year Later, PUEBLO CHIEFTAN, Sept. 8, 2010, available at http://chieftain.com/local/
article_78ab4542-bb0d-11df-9ee3-001cc4c03286.html.
241. See THE AMERICAN WEST, supra note 217 at 51.
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closed its Sugar City mill in 1967,242 CLADCO bought the land and its
associated water rights for $380 per acre (claiming that it intended to
operate Christmas-tree farms and produce lettuce).243 By 1970, CLADCO
owned 23 percent of all Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company stock;
two years later it owned 55 percent.244 After the acquisition, CLADCO
negotiated the sale of its Twin Lakes shares to the cities of Aurora, Colo-
rado Springs, and Pueblo for between $2,300 and $2,400 per acre-foot.245
Many farmers who did not sell to CLADCO organized themselves and
sold directly to the cities for $1,075 per share for their Twin Lakes inter-
ests.246 By 1980, CLADCO went out of business and the three cities
owned 94 percent of Twin Lakes’ shares.247
In 1979 the last beet-sugar factory in the Valley closed.248 It sold its
land and 446.48 of 800 total shares in the Rocky Ford Ditch Company to
Resource Investment Group, Ltd., making them the majority shareholder
overnight.249 Later, Resource Investment Group transferred these shares
to the city of Aurora for $2,200 per acre-foot.250 Aurora had an option on
the other half of shares for $2,200 per acre-foot.251 Aurora eventually set-
tled on a transfer of 8,250 acre-feet of water per year from the Rocky
Ford Ditch, drying up 4,000 acres of land.252 By 1991, agricultural water
right sales took 56,000 of the 320,000 irrigated acres between Pueblo and
the Kansas state line out of production.253 The net loss of water trans-
ferred from the Arkansas Basin between 1955 and 2002 totaled 148,602
acre-feet.254 Pueblo and Aurora now hold the majority of these rights.255
The transfers took 64,445 acres of land out of agricultural production.256
In November 2002, voters in the Arkansas Valley agreed to form
the Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District (LAVWCD).257
242. MACDONNELL, supra note 226 at 57. R
243. See THE AMERICAN WEST, supra note 217 at 51–52.
244. Id. at 52.
245. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 150 (1992).
246. See THE AMERICAN WEST, supra note 217, at 53.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 70.
254. MACDONNELL, supra note 217 at 57. R
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See The Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation Dist., About the LAVWCD,
http://www.lavwcd.com/about.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
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Although most conservancy districts form to develop water resources,
LAVWCD’s mission is to ensure the continued availability of water re-
sources and the long-term economic viability of the Lower Arkansas Val-
ley.258 The District formed a steering committee with two representatives
from each ditch company to determine the possibility of a cooperative
water-leasing effort.259 This ultimately led to the organization of the
Super Ditch Company.260
In 2006, the LAVWCD hired an engineering firm to conduct a fea-
sibility study on a water-leasing program in the Arkansas Basin.261 The
study made preliminary estimates of the quantity of water available for
leasing and identified potential ditch companies to participate in the pro-
gram.262 The ditches that fit the qualities necessary for the program in-
cluded Bessemer Ditch, Rocky Ford Highline Canal, Oxford Farmers
Ditch, Otero Canal, Catlin Canal, Holbrook Canal, Fort Lyon Storage Ca-
nal and Fort Lyon Canal.263
The LAVWCD also began to engage local irrigators to educate
them about water transfer alternatives.264 Following a workshop in
2006,265 the LAVWCD sponsored a trip to California for representatives
of 7 ditch companies to learn about the rotational fallowing program be-
tween the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) and Palo Verde Irrigation
District (PVID) in Southern California.266 Under this program, growers
fallow between 7 percent and 35 percent of their land annually.267 All
participants must make a long-term commitment to the program and are
258. See The Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservation Dist., Our Mission, http://
www.lavwcd.com/mission.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). (The LAVWCD’s Mission
Statement declares that its purpose is “[t]o acquire, retain and conserve water resources
within the Lower Arkansas River Valley. To encourage the use of such water for the socio-
economic benefit of the District citizens. To participate in water-related projects that will
embody thoughtful conservation, responsible growth, and beneficial water usage within
the Lower Arkansas Valley, including the acceptance of conservation easements, with or
without water.”).
259. Jay Winner & Mary Lou Smith, Colorado’s “Super Ditch”: Can Farmers Cooperate To
Make Lemonade Out of Lemons?, Report to the United States Committee on Irrigation and
Drainage 157 (Mar. 30, 2008).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 155; see also HDR ENGINEERING, INC., LOWER ARKANSAS VALLEY WATER LEAS-
ING POTENTIAL PRELIMINARY FEASIBILITY INVESTIGATION, REPORT TO LOWER ARKANSAS VALLEY
WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT (2006) [hereinafter HDR ENGINEERING].
262. Id. The study analyzed natural stream flow data from 1956 through 2004.
263. Id. at 2.
264. Winner & Smith, supra note 259 at 156. R
265. Id. at 157.
266. Id.
267. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., THE STATEWIDE WATER
SUPPLY INITIATIVE: PHASE 2 (SWSI) 3–22 (2007) [hereinafter SWSI 2007].
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paid per acre of land fallowed.268 The program provides between 25,000
and 111,000 acre-feet of water to MWD each year and water providers
are able to use existing infrastructure to facilitate the program.269 The
program was possible in part because MWD paid for all administrative
costs and reimbursed PVID for all of its expenses.270
The success of MWD/PVID program stirred interest among sev-
eral mutual ditch companies in the Lower Arkansas Basin.271 However,
one important difference between PVID and LAVWCD became evident
immediately. The MWD/PVID agreement involves one ditch and one
water right, providing water to one water supply entity.272 By contrast, a
rotational fallowing program in the Lower Arkansas Basin would in-
volve seven ditch companies and a multitude of water rights, supplying
water to as yet unknown municipalities.273 This would allow the
LAVWCD to create an open market whereby it could lease to anyone
who needs water within the Basin, but it would also require the seller to
aggregate multiple water rights, possibly with multiple buyers, thereby
greatly increasing the complexity of the transfers and other terms of an
agreement among the relevant parties.274 This is of particular concern
given the problem of high transaction costs that have long been associ-
ated with water transfers.275
In an effort to move the concept of a long-term leasing program
forward, the LAVWCD established the Super Ditch Company to act as a
facilitator for the collective leasing of water rights between municipali-
ties in southeastern Colorado and individual shareholders of different
ditch companies.276 The Company will negotiate the terms and condi-
tions of long-term water rights leases with cities, and water shareholders
will provide the water from seven ditch companies within the Lower
Arkansas Valley.277 If participating shareholders agree to the terms of the
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 3–25.
271. Winner & Smith, supra note 259 at 157. R
272. Id.; Telephone Interview with Jay Winner, Executive Director, Lower Arkansas
Valley Water Conservation District, in Boulder, Colo. (Aug. 13, 2009).
273. See Winner & Smith, supra note 259 at 157. R
274. HDR ENGINEERING, supra note 261 at 84–85. R
275. For a discussion of transaction costs see the text accompanying footnotes 70–73. R
276. See Peter D. Nichols, Memorandum to Water Tables Regarding The Super Ditch: A Tem-
porary Water Leasing Alternative to Historical Permanent ‘Buy and Dry’ or Irrigated Land in the
Lower Arkansas Valley ¶ B (July 7, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum to Water Tables].
277. Thomas McMahon, Memorandum to Colo. Water Conservation Bd. and the Lower Ar-
kansas Valley Water Conservancy Dist., Regarding Antitrust Implications of Plan by Lower Arkan-
sas Valley Super Ditch Co. to Collectively Lease Water Rights 1 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter
Memorandum on Antitrust Implications].
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individual cities, and pledge sufficient water rights to satisfy a city’s
needs, specific shareholders will enter into leases with the municipal-
ity.278 If shareholders do not pledge a sufficient amount of water rights,
the Super Ditch will re-open negotiations.279 Throughout this process,
ditch company shareholders remain free to seek out leases indepen-
dently or sell water rights to other entities until their rights are
committed.280
Ditch company shareholders that enter into a negotiated water
lease will become shareholders in the Super Ditch Company.281 Share-
holders will be paid a small annual fee and receive additional money in
years when portions of their water rights are used in the program to
make up for the lack of production on their land.282 The number of shares
received will be based on the amount of water each shareholder provides
under the lease and will be adjusted for the value of the water coming
from her respective ditch as engineering studies determine.283 Sharehold-
ers will then remain part of the Super Ditch Company as long as they
provide water for leasing.284
Given the complicated nature of the Super Ditch proposal, it is
unsurprising that the LAVWCD has encountered a variety of legal, logis-
tical, and political difficulties in organizing the Super Ditch Company.285
Among these was the challenge of persuading irrigators to participate
before the basic details of the program were decided, such as the price
per acre-foot of water and the length of leases.286 For now, interested par-
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Articles of Incorporation of the Lower Arkansas Super Ditch Company ¶ 3.2(a)
(May 7, 2008) [hereinafter Articles of Incorporation].
282. Memorandum to Water Tables, supra note 276 at 1; see also Chris Woodka, Lower Ark R
Takes Hard Look at “Super Ditch,” THE PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN, Jan. 18, 2007.
283. See Articles of Incorporation, supra note 281 at ¶ 3.2(b). R
284. Memorandum to Water Tables, supra note 276. R
285. For example, historically, the ditch companies involved in the Super Ditch Com-
pany have had trouble working together. HDR ENGINEERING, supra note 259, at 109. There R
are logistical hurdles in determining how shares in the company will be distributed to
irrigators because different ditches have different yields and quality of water. See Articles
of Incorporation, supra note 281 at 3.2(b) (describing that the amount of shares disbursed R
will vary depending on the particular ditch and its historic yield and water quality). Addi-
tionally, some of the ditch companies’ bylaws do not allow the ditch’s water to be used on
lands not served by the ditch. See Winner & Smith, supra note 259, at 158. R
286. Chris Woodka, Roundtable Supports Study of Super Ditch, THE PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN,
Sept. 13, 2007.
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ties have simply been asked to pledge a willingness to participate, con-
tingent upon the final terms of the program.287
The legal problems are potentially even more daunting. Most im-
portantly, the Company will have to seek judicial approval for each of its
leases prior to changing the point of diversion and new use of the water
right. For purposes of transferring water rights, Colorado law histori-
cally does not differentiate between temporary or long-term transfers or
between leases and permanent transfers.288 The process for gaining water
court approval will significantly increase transaction costs and could
compromise the success of the Super Ditch proposal.
However, if these problems can be overcome, the Super Ditch
Company will administer a rotational fallowing program that will make
water available for leasing within the Arkansas River Basin.289 Local irri-
gators will fallow a portion of their land and the corresponding water
that would have been consumed by crops will be leased to municipali-
ties.290 Any water in excess of a crop’s consumptive use will be returned
to the river and used to satisfy other existing water rights.291 Participa-
tion by irrigators will be entirely voluntary and all irrigators will be al-
lowed to choose the extent to which they wish to commit their land to
the program.292 Participating irrigators will be responsible for monitoring
weeds and controlling erosion on their fallowed land.293
LAVWCD hired a consulting firm to ascertain how much water
might be available for lease through the proposed fallowing program.294
The consultants concluded that the potential volumes of water would
vary from year to year depending on whether the year was classified as
wet, average, or dry.295 During a dry year, the mean yield would likely be
14,020 acre-feet296 with estimated annual revenues of approximately $9.8
million.297 During average years, the mean yield would be 28,630 acre-
287. Winner & Smith, supra note 259, at 158. Additionally, LAVWCD had to address the R
practice among ditch companies of including in their bylaws clauses restricting the use of
water to lands served directly by the ditch.
288. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(3.5) (2012). See also, Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin
Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 506 (Colo. 1982).
289. See Articles of Incorporation, supra note 281 at 2.1. R
290. HDR ENGINEERING, supra note 261, at 3. R
291. Id.
292. Memorandum to Water Tables, supra note 275 at ¶ C. Irrigators can agree to commit
0, 25, 50, or 100 percent of their lands.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 5.
295. See HDR ENGINEERING, supra note 261, at 17–18. R
296. Id. at 73.
297. Id. at 77.
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feet.298 However, because 14,020 acre-feet of this total would be commit-
ted to the dry-year market, only 14,610 acre-feet would be available for
leasing on the average-year market.299 Since there would be a greater va-
riability in yield compared to the dry market, average-year leases would
be offered at a lower price to consumers and would be more attractive to
customers who possess alternative water sources or raw water storage.300
The average-year market should be able to make full deliveries for 16 out
of 29 years with estimated annual revenues of approximately $7.3 mil-
lion.301 Approximately 45,400 acre-feet would be available to lease in the
wet-year market.302 However, 28,630 acre-feet of this yield would be
committed to the dry- and average-year markets, making the remaining
yield for the wet-year market 16,770 acre-feet.303 Estimated annual reve-
nues from wet-market leases could reach $2.5 million.304
Revenues aside, the loss of useable water resources will adversely
affect the agricultural economy of the Lower Arkansas Valley.305 The re-
ductions in annual income from in-basin transfers are estimated at
$1,424,200 and annual losses from out-of-basin transfers could be as high
as $4,019,700.306 Moreover, the region could see a loss of 550 agricultural-
related jobs, and annual tax revenue losses of approximately
$3,900,000.307 In the case of in-basin transfers, however, agricultural
losses would be partially offset by the economic activity surrounding the
new water uses in the basin.308
C. Lessons Learned from the CBT Project and Super Ditch Proposal
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District operates
what is arguably the most efficient water market in the country.309 Its
298. Id. at 74.
299. Id. (assuming that customers leasing on the dry-year market take delivery every
year and the average-year market customers lease the remaining yield, then 14.610 acre-feet
is a minimum yield for average years).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 75. (assuming partial deliveries would be available to customers in 27 of 29
years, with revenues corresponding to the amount of water delivered).
302. Id. at 75. (assuming again that the dry and average-year markets take delivery
every year, and the wet-year market buys the remaining water).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. CHUCK HOWE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EXPORTING WATER FROM THE LOWER ARKAN-
SAS VALLEY §3.1 (Feb. 2009).
306. Id. at § 3.3.3.
307. Id.
308. Id. at § 3.3.1.
309. See supra text accompanying note 89 (showing that of the 353 permanent water R
transfers in the west from 2007-2009, 61% involved CBT units).
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success is apparent from the high demand for CBT water and the high
price that it commands.310 Yet the high price of CBT shares also suggests
a strain on the supply of other water resources available for sale in the
region. The streamlined process for transferring CBT water highlights
the obstacles to transferring other water, especially since CBT water rep-
resents only a small fraction of the water used in northeastern Colo-
rado.311 Moreover, NCWCD’s policies unnecessarily constrain the market
by limiting municipal purchases to 80 percent of CBT shares.312 If other
water resources within the CBT service area were more easily bought
and sold, and if access to the NCWCD’s distribution system was readily
available at a fair price to other water buyers and sellers, one could im-
agine a far more robust market with the ability to trade water at much
lower prices. Furthermore, a flourishing market for water could obviate
the need for water projects that are currently proposed to bring more
Western slope water to the Front Range. The environmental advantages
to the West Slope, and perhaps even to the Front Range, that might be
realized by abandoning these proposed projects are significant.
The lessons to be learned from the Northern Colorado Water Con-
servancy District are not limited to northeastern Colorado. First, water
districts and mutual ditch companies throughout the West share many of
the characteristics that make the NCWCD experience widely transferable
to other regions. These characteristics include:
• Water rights that are available for a wide range of uses over
a relatively large geographic area;
• Water rights that are sufficiently fungible that the location
and type of use will not significantly impact other users;
• A delivery system that allows distribution of the water over
a significant portion of the geographic area, including delivery
to urban centers, perhaps with modest infrastructure
improvements.
310. See 2007Annual Transaction Review, supra note 90 (explaining that in 2007, on aver- R
age CBT units were purchased at $9,215–$10,500/unit ($13,164–$15,000/AF)).
311. See U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado-Big Thompson Project, http://www.
usbr.gov/projects/Project.jsp?proj_Name=Colorado-Big+Thompson+Project (reporting
CBT water use accounts for approximately 260,000 acre feet annually); also Colo. Dep’t of
Natural Res., Interim Water Supply and Needs Report for the South Platte Basin and Denver/
South Metro Counties, available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/water-management/basin-
roundtables/Documents/SouthPlatte/MetroSPInterimBasinWaterSupplyNeedsReport.pdf
(reporting groundwater use alone in northeastern Colorado is estimated at 880,000 acre feet
annually).
312. Interview with Carlson & Werner, supra note 136. R
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A less obvious but additional lesson that can be gleaned from the
NCWCD experience is the importance of allowing water buyers and sell-
ers access to the elaborate distribution systems that typically characterize
publicly-financed water projects. Because the NCWCD project was de-
signed and is operated to provide supplemental water supplies, a sub-
stantial base of primary water rights owners could potentially benefit
from fair access to the NCWCD distribution system. California requires
water utilities to provide access to other water distributors when the util-
ity has excess capacity,313 and such legislation should be encouraged
throughout the West.
The NCWCD case study also illustrates more generally the enor-
mous value of a free and open market for water. If water rights can be
defined not merely as an amount available for withdrawal, but also in
terms of the amount of water consumed by the current use, that con-
sumptive use can be converted to a presumptively marketable quantity
of water. This offers the prospect for a truly open and robust water mar-
ket that has the potential to reduce the price of water and make water
shortages a thing of the past.
Expanding the scope of water rights that have the marketing ad-
vantages of CBT project water will require both political courage and
modest legal reform. But with shortages looming in important water ba-
sins, like the Colorado and South Platte,314 and with climate change
threatening to exacerbate an already difficult problem it would be fool-
hardy not to make an effort to build on the CBT’s success.
The Super Ditch proposal suggests some additional innovations,
especially in the context of temporary water transfers or water-leasing
programs. These programs hold promise both for moving water effi-
ciently to urban communities, and for protecting rural areas that may
otherwise face the prospect of losing water rights permanently. The rota-
tional fallowing program that was pioneered by the Palo Verde Irriga-
tion District (PVID) in its agreement with the Metropolitan Water
District (MWD) offers a useful model for the proponents of the Super
Ditch, but it also serves to highlight the complexity of the institutional
arrangements that are contemplated by the Super Ditch proposal. The
313. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1810–1814 (1986); But see Gray, supra note 29, at 33 (asserting R
that while these water wheeling statutes are helpful, they have been criticized recently for
inadequately defining (1) what “unused capacity” means and how it is determined under
the statute, (2) what “fair compensation” is, and (3) the rights of parties attempting to wheel
water of a substantially different quality than the agency’s water.
314. See SWSI 2010, supra note 214, § 5, at 5-28 tbl.5-12 (estimating that by 2050 the R
Colorado River Basin in Colorado is will experience a 22,000–48,000 acre foot per year
shortage or gap and that the South Platte River Basin in Colorado will experience a
36,000–170,000 acre foot per year shortage or gap).
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Super Ditch Company intends to engage farmers from multiple ditch
companies to provide water for a number of southern Front Range cities
that have yet to be specifically identified. The Super Ditch Company also
seems to duplicate some of the goals of the Lower Arkansas Valley
Water Conservancy District, but would operate distinctly from that
entity.
Assuming these organizational complications can be addressed
adequately, opportunities for rotational fallowing, as well as water bank-
ing and interruptible supply agreements or “dry-year options,” do hold
promise.315 Rotational fallowing seems to be driving the Super Ditch pro-
posal, perhaps because it is viewed as offering the greatest potential for
amassing a substantial amount of water that could be made available on
a relatively permanent basis. However, the opportunities for banking
and dry-year options should not be overlooked.
Water banking, in particular, could hold promise given the sub-
stantial storage capacity in the Arkansas Basin.316 One could imagine, for
example, an arrangement comparable to that between Arizona and the
Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA). In this example, SNWA
sends surplus water to Arizona for storage and later use in Arizona, with
the understanding that SNWA receives credits that will allow it to with-
draw an equivalent amount of water from Lake Mead.317 Similarly, a
southern Front Range city could allow its surplus water supplies to pass
by its diversion point for storage in an Arkansas Basin reservoir, where it
could be made available for downstream users. The city would then
have the opportunity to use that water in a dry year when it needs addi-
tional supplies.
315. See Articles of Incorporation, supra note 281, § 2.1 (providing that Super Ditch irri- R
gators can participate in water banking, interruptible supply agreements, and water
banking).
316. COLO. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., STATEWIDE WATER
SUPPLY INITIATIVE: FACT SHEET, ARKANSAS BASIN 1 (2006) (listing the major storage facilities
or projects in the Arkansas River Basin as: John Martin Reservoir (618,600 acre-feet), Pueblo
Reservoir (357,678 acre-feet), Great Plains Reservoir (265,552 acre-feet), Twin Lakes (141,000
acre-feet), Turquoise Reservoir (129,440 acre-feet), Trinidad Reservoir (119,887 acre-feet),
Adobe Creek Reservoir (71,000 acre-feet), Cuchara Valley Reservoir (40,960 acre-feet), Lake
Meredith (39,804 acre-feet), Horse Creek Reservoir (28,000 acre-feet), Mt. Elbert Forebay
(11,530 acre-feet), Clear Creek Reservoir (11,500 acre-feet), Lake Henry (9,500 acre-feet), St.
Charles Reservoir No. 3 (8,638 acre-feet), Dye Reservoir (5,640 acre-feet), Holbrook Reser-
voir (4,600 acre-feet), Brush Hollow Reservoir (3,933 acre-feet), Mt. Pisgah Reservoir (2,471
acre-feet), and Deweese-Dye Reservoir (1,772 acre-feet)).
317. See STORAGE AND INTERSTATE RELEASE AGREEMENT, Sec’y of Interior-Ariz. Water
Banking Auth.–S. Nev. Water Auth.-Colo. River Comm’n of Nev., June 12, 2001, Contract
No. 02-XX-30-W0406 [hereinafter The Storage and Interstate Release Agreement], available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/SIRA/finagmt.pdf; See also Patricia Mulroy, Be-
yond the Division: A Compact That Unites, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 105, 109 (2008).
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Dry-year options could also be constructed creatively to allow cit-
ies to take a fixed amount of agricultural water in dry years, either from
a willing individual user or perhaps from an entire ditch company, that
might be willing to forego a certain percentage of its supply in a dry
year. The remaining water could be allocated proportionally among mu-
tual shareholders or farmers could opt for more or less water with the
payment of appropriate fees.
VI. Reforming Water Transfer Law in an Era of Climate Change
While it can be argued persuasively that the basic structure of
prior appropriation law requires reform,318 fundamental changes to that
law are neither politically tenable nor necessary to address the most
pressing problems facing water resources management in the West. But
modest reform and new ways of thinking about western water law are
necessary if the West is going to meet the challenges posed by growing
demands for water in an era of climate change. Several recommenda-
tions are set forth below that could, if implemented, provide water re-
sources to meet the needs of the West during an era when climate change
promises to tax an already fragile water resources picture for the 21st
century and beyond.
A. Define Water Rights by Consumptive Use and Allow
Presumptive Transfers of the Consumptive Use Amount
Western water rights have historically been defined in terms of
the amount of water diverted for a particular use on a particular tract of
land. The amount of water consumed can vary so long as the location
and type of use does not change. Under current state water law, how-
ever, consumptive use becomes relevant only when a water user decides
to sell the water right. At that point, the amount available for transfer
will generally be limited to the amount of water historically consumed.319
318. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FU-
TURE OF THE WEST 21–22 (1992); Leila C. Behnampour, Reforming a Western Water Institution:
How Expanding the Productivity of Water Rights Could Lessen our Water Woes, 41 ENVTL. L. 201,
204 (2011) (explaining that the prior appropriation doctrine hinders water conservation);
Mark Honhart, Carrots for Conservation: Oregon’s Water Conservation Statute Offers Incentives
to Invest in Efficiency, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 828 (1995) (describing how the prior appro-
priation doctrine has become an obstacle to dealing with the problem of inefficient water
use in the West); Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
317, 344 (1985); Charles F. Wilkinson, Prior Appropriation 1848–1991, 21 ENVTL. L., at v
(1991).
319. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1725 (1988); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-222 (1919); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104(a)(1977).
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State water law further prohibits the transfer of the consumptive amount
if such a transfer would cause even the tiniest injury.320 For opponents of
a transfer, the no injury rule provides an opportunity to drag out the
transfer process for many years at great expense to everyone involved.
These high transaction costs stand as one of the biggest disincentives to
water transfers.
As previously suggested, the absolute nature of the no injury rule
as applied to water transfers is entirely at odds with the more flexible
approach used in a raft of other areas of water law, such as measuring
the accuracy of the diversion amount or allowing water users to change
to crops that consume more water.321 A similar flexibility should be em-
braced for water transfers since water transfers may very well hold the
key to addressing the water scarcity issues that are expected to arise in
the future.322
Defining water rights in terms of both the diversion amount and
the consumptive use is relatively simple and would not disrupt the his-
toric operation of state water law. It would, however, impose a modest
administrative burden on the state, particularly during the time that the
state is establishing consumptive use amounts for existing water rights.
Once the state has defined all water rights within a basin in terms of both
the diversion amount and consumptive use amount, the state would be
in the position to presumptively allow the transfer of that consumptive
use amount, at least within the same water basin, subject to minimal pro-
cedure. The processes for defining consumptive use rights and for al-
lowing the transfer of these rights require elaboration.
First, defining all water rights in a state in terms of both the diver-
sion amount and consumptive use will take time, but it can be accom-
plished deliberately over a period of years. This will allow states to gain
experience carrying out the task fairly and efficiently. States might begin
with a rulemaking process to help define terms, but should probably re-
sist trying to do much with rules in favor of learning through case-by-
case adjudication, at least until the process is reasonably well under-
stood. In terms of actually adjudicating consumptive use amounts, there
are a number of options. States could initially focus on the most water-
320. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)(2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.370 (2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (1977).
321. See Squillace, supra note 35. R
322. See, e.g., ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 264 (1903) (maintaining that the
focus on precision in water transfers most likely reflects the suspicions of early legislators.
By making it difficult to transfer water, the law minimized the concerns that early water
applicants would just sell any excess water rights they acquired).
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stressed basins and gradually work toward covering all basins.323 Start-
ing in the most water-stressed basins would facilitate water transfers in
the basins that would benefit the most from them. Alternatively, a state
might choose to begin with a small basin that is not facing any particular
water shortage in order to obtain a better understanding of possible chal-
lenges it might face when tackling a more complex basin. A third, and
perhaps the most practical option would be to begin with one or more
water districts or mutual ditch companies in a given basin, since these
entities generally hold large water rights that could be adjudicated more
efficiently. Moreover, they might be in the best position to pool a signifi-
cant amount of water for sale to a municipal supplier.324
The initial consumptive decisions should be made in draft form
by the appropriate state official, such as the State Engineer, who could
work in cooperation with a state agricultural school. Many of these
schools have already done the pioneering work in determining water
consumption by crops in different water basins.325 This work focuses on
different types of basins throughout western states.326
323. Starting in the most water-stressed basins would facilitate water transfers in the
basins that would benefit the most from them.
324. See discussion infra Part IV.C. (explaining that water supply organizations are
probably in the best position to mimic the success of the CBT water market, and will be in a
better position to do this if the law makes it easier to transfer consumptive use amounts).
325. See, e.g. Jose´ Luis Cha´vez, Dale Straw, Luis A Garcia, Thomas W Ley, Allan A
Andales, Lane H Simmons, Michael E Bartolo & Christopher M.U Neale, Remote Sensing ET
of Alfalfa Using a Surface Aerodynamic Temperature Model, 5th National Decennial Irrigation
Conference Proceedings (Dec. 5-8, 2010); Bruce A. Lytle, Neil Hansen, Frank P. Jaeger & Jim
Nikkel, Urban & Rural Water Supplies, THE WATER REPORT, no. 48, Feb. 2008, at 18, February,
2008, available at http://www.thewaterreport.com/Issues%2045%20to%2048.html. See also
Save The Poudre Coalition, A Review of the Likely Agricultural Impacts from the Northern Inte-
grated Supply Project, Appendix A (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.savethepoudre.
org/docs/stp_ag_impacts_analysis.pdf, citing the U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002
Census of Agriculture, available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/ and U.S. Department
of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, available at http://www.nass.usda.
gov/. See also, Elisa Sims Albury, Jerry Keller, John W. Longworth, Molly L. Magnuson &
Julie M. Valdez, New Mexico Water Use by Categories 2005, at 24 (incorporating New
Mexico State University research on water use for alfalfa irrigation), available at http://
www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/Publications/Library/TechnicalReports/TechReport-052.pdf.
326. See, e.g., Ahmed E. Al-Juaidi, Water Allocation for Agricultural Use Considering
Treated Wastewater, Public Health Risk, and Economic Issues, at 33 (May 1, 2009) (Ph.d
thesis, Utah State University) available at http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1250&context=etd&sei-redir=1#search=%22crops%20water%20consumption%
22 (discussing Utah’s Bear River Valley Basin); ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL WATER TRANS-
FER METHODS, supra note 212, Table 1, at 8-9 (estimating seasonal water crop requirements R
for the South Platte, Republican, and Arkansas Basins); Timothy K. Gates, Luis A. Garcia, &
John W. Labadie, Toward Optimal Water Management in Colorado’s Lower Arkansas River Val-
ley, COLORADO WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE COMPLETION REPORT, No. 205 (June,
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Unlike traditional water rights, which are often defined in terms
of a flow right, consumptive use rights would always be defined in terms
of volume of water, often acre-feet. The owner of the water right, and
other interested members of the public, should be afforded an opportu-
nity to comment on the draft consumptive use decisions. States could
minimize the opportunities for objections by authorizing the state agency
to treat crop and soil-types somewhat generically. This would allow
states to cover large tracts of land fairly quickly, especially where scien-
tific data is already available.
Challenges to these consumptive use determinations could be lim-
ited to: (1) whether the agency used the best scientific information in
making its judgment; (2) whether a particular tract of land fits the soil
profile used to make the decision; and (3) whether the crop chosen to
estimate historic consumptive use accurately reflects that land’s histori-
cal cropping pattern. Regarding this last point, the legislation might
place the burden on the agricultural user of demonstrating to the appro-
priate state official the historic farming practices on the particular tract of
land. The legislation might also clarify the meaning of historic practices,
perhaps by setting out the historic period subject to review and the num-
ber of years necessary to show historic use for growing a particular crop.
Alternatively, the appropriate state agency could adopt rules describing
how it will determine historic practices and other issues that might be
raised in the proceeding.
Once the consumptive use judgments are final, the owners of
those rights would be free to sell all or any portion of the consumptive
use amount. It might be wise, however, to build into the legislation a
provision that subjects each transfer to a 10 percent reduction to protect
stream flows and to help account for any errors in the system. The pro-
posed transfer would still have to go through a notification and decision
process, but objectors should not be allowed to complain about the origi-
nal consumptive use judgment that was made during the basin review
process.
While at first blush, farmers might be suspicious of a streamlined
water transfer process, it potentially offers them a way to profit from
their substantial agricultural water rights while continuing to farm. Sup-
pose, for example, that a farmer in northeastern Colorado receives a con-
2006), available at http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/cr/205.pdf; Amber Kirkpat-
rick, Linzy Browning, James W. Bauder, Reagan Waskom, Matt Neibauer & Grant Cardon,
Irrigating with Limited Water Supplies: A Practical Guide to Choosing Crops Well-Suited to Lim-
ited Irrigation, at 11 (2006), available at http://region8water.colostate.edu/PDFs/Irrigat-
ing%20with%20Limited%20Water%20Supplies.pdf (Estimating water consumptive use of
select crops in Montana, Colorado, Utah, and Alberta).
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sumptive use declaration of 193 acre-feet of water for 100 acres of land
on which the farmer historically grew alfalfa.327 If the farmer were will-
ing to switch to a crop such as soybeans, which consumes only 122 acre-
feet of water,328 that farmer would be able to sell the remaining 71 acre-
feet while continuing to farm. The state would have to verify the change
in crop and ensure that the farmer does not revert to a more water con-
sumptive crop in the future. Eventually, advances in satellite imaging
technology should make it possible to monitor the type of crop being
grown by farmers at a relatively low cost.329 Even greater savings might
be realized if the farmer were to limit an alfalfa crop to one, or perhaps
two, cuttings each year rather than the more typical three cuttings. In-
deed, with climate change, Colorado farmers may be in a position to take
a fourth cutting, thereby consuming more water than they have histori-
cally consumed. While many agricultural rights are defined as “sea-
sonal,” the length of the season is often not specified in the water rights
decree.330
A similar scenario could play out with a dry-year option. Our
farmer could sell an option on 71 acre-feet for use by a city during dry
years, grow alfalfa in high water years, and shift to a low water-con-
sumption crop in dry years when the city would receive the optioned
water.
Importantly, none of this is possible under the current legal re-
gime. The farmer who shifts from alfalfa to soybeans receives no credit
327. Antony Frank & David Carlson, Colorado’s Net Irrigation Requirements for Agri-
culture 1995, Table 1: Normal Year Net Irrigation Requirements, (1999), (calculating off
figures for Weld County), available at http://cospl.coalliance.org/fez/eserv/co:3072/ag
92ir71999internet.pdf.
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., A Guide to the Practical Use of Aerial Color-infrared Photography in Agriculture
Agricultural Applications of Color-infrared Film, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN http://
www.casde.unl.edu/activities/cir-uses/applications/crop-inventory.php (last visited
Nov. 5, 2012); Ping Zhang, Bruce Anderson, Bin Tan, Dong Huang & Ranga Myeni, Poten-
tial Monitoring of Crop Production Using a Satellite-Based Climate-Variability Impact Index,
AGRIC. AND FOREST METEOROLOGY, no. 132 (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://cybele.bu.edu/
download/manuscripts/zhping02.pdf (detailing the potential agricultural capabilities of differ-
ent types of imaging satellites and noting that historical data and visual inspection are
currently necessary to supplement satellite data.); Stephan J. Maas & NITHYA RAJAN, Esti-
mating Ground Cover of Field Crops Using Medium-Resolution Multispectral Satellite Imagery,
100 AGRONOMY JOURNAL, no. 2, Mar. 2008, at 320, 327. (observing that automation of satel-
lite technology to monitor the vegetation canopy and bare soil line could be possible in the
future, but currently has to be coupled with visual inspection).
330. See Douglas Kenney, et al., THE IMPACT OF EARLIER SPRING SNOWMELT ON WATER
RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATION: A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN
THE WESTERN STATES 4-6, (2008), available at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/
publication_files/resource-2715-2008.24.pdf.
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for the water saved, and pays no penalty for shifting from soybeans to
alfalfa, even if soybeans had been grown on the site for 100 years. While
the prospect of selling water sometime in the future may not be the driv-
ing force behind decisions that farmers make about the types of crops to
grow, it is surely an important factor in any cropping decision. The in-
centives under the current system are all in favor of consuming more
water. The proposed reforms would give farmers the incentive to con-
sume less water, and in the process, potentially solve water scarcity is-
sues for many years to come.
B. Demand Conservation and Reclamation Before Agricultural to
Urban Transfers are Approved
Residents of rural areas are understandably unhappy about the
prospect of watching water resources that have historically supported
their local economies transferred to urban use. While a free market in
water could accelerate this trend, states can and should provide rural
communities with some assurance that water transfers will not be ap-
proved unless, and until, the buyer first demonstrates a clear need for
additional water resources and takes responsibility for restoring the land
from which the water will be transferred to an appropriate condition ad-
equate to promote and sustain its value and future uses.331
Municipal suppliers might demonstrate need by using all reason-
able conservation measures in the communities they serve. “Reasonable
conservation measures” could be defined either by statute or regulation
as measures that bring per capita water use below a certain threshold, or
perhaps through more prescriptive standards such as requiring that cit-
ies employ aggressive block rate pricing policies,332 or requiring that
states recycle gray water.333
Restoration of the land might simply entail a commitment, backed
by a bond, requiring the city to establish a healthy, self-regenerating
community of native grasses on the dry lands. Alternatively, it might
involve some long-term commitment to engage in dry land farming334 or
331. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305 (4.5)(a) (2011) (providing specifically for such
protection).
332. See, e.g., Douglas S. Kenney, et al., Residential Demand Management: Lessons from
Aurora, Colorado, 44 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 192 (2008).
333. See, e.g., Yoram Cohen, Gray Water: A Potential Source of Water, SOUTHERN CALIFOR-
NIA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT CARD (Fall, 2009) http://www.environment.ucla.edu/report
card/article.asp?parentid=4870.
334. See generally, Randy Creswell & Franklin W. Martin, Dryland Farming: Crops and
Techniques for Arid Regions, EDUCATIONAL CONCERNS FOR HUNGER ORGANIZATION (1998),
http://www.echonet.org/repositories/download/30/Dryland%20Farming.pdf (introduc-
ing appropriate techniques for dryland farming in arid regions).
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some other use that will ensure that the land does not become a burden
to the host community.
While rural areas may continue to harbor some antipathy toward
cities for their ever increasing demands for water, farmers are far more
likely to accept water transfers if they can see that the cities have made
an aggressive commitment to conservation as a pre-condition to having
agricultural water transfers approved. In addition, if rural communities
are assured that lands that are dried up as a result of agricultural to ur-
ban water transfers are restored to some productive use, they may be
more open to reform.
C. Encourage Private and Public Agencies with Substantial Storage
Capacity and a Large Service Area to Mimic the Success of the CBT
Project
The CBT project is unique. Not only does it have the benefit of
substantial storage in the system, but it also holds water rights that are
approved for a broad range of uses, operates an elaborate delivery sys-
tem in the most populous areas of the northern Front Range, and covers
a substantial portion of the northeastern part of Colorado.335 Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that the limited supply of CBT shares
attracts many buyers and sellers. While it may be unlikely that other
water organizations will have all of the advantages of the CBT project,
many water entities will likely share some transferable characteristics of
the CBT project. For example, some water entities could conceivably es-
tablish marketable shares, similar to CBT shares, especially if states es-
tablished a system to facilitate the transfer of consumptive use amounts,
as suggested above.336
Most ditch companies hold legal title to the water rights used by
their shareholders, but shares can be purchased by cities for urban use.337
However, most ditch companies’ water rights were granted strictly for
agricultural use over a relatively small geographic area that may not in-
clude significant urban centers.338 Under these circumstances, changing
the use and the place of use will require the parties to go through the
cumbersome statutory transfer process.
335. See discussion supra Part V.A.
336. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
337. See discussion supra, Part V.B.; see generally Jacobucci v. Dist. Court In and For
Jefferson Cnty., 189 Colo. 380, 386-91, 541 P.2d 667, 671–674 (1975) (discussing the unique
organization of mutual ditch corporations under Colorado law and the relationship with
their shareholders regarding ownership of the “right to make beneficial use of . . . water”);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-42-101 to 118 (2011).
338. See NCWCD Management Plan, supra note 120, at Appendix C. R
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D. Promote Temporary Transfers
States should recognize the natural advantages that these organi-
zations share with the NCWCD and the opportunities that would arise if
they had more flexibility to transfer water rights outside the current
transfer system. As previously argued, granting water organizations an
easier path toward transfers would, at a minimum, require that their
consumptive rights be clearly defined. Once that is done, states could use
a streamlined transfer process to allow mutual ditch companies and
water districts to transfer consumptive rights outside their districts and
for new uses.339 This would open up more robust marketing opportuni-
ties for these entities, and thereby resolve many of our current urban
water needs.
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the potential for
temporary transfers to solve long-term water needs. While such transfers
could be short-term or long-term, they are all distinguished by the fact
that the party holding the water right does not relinquish her ownership
interest.
For farmers concerned about the long-term health of their rural
communities, this is a very attractive feature. As previously described,
successful real-world examples of temporary transfers already exist, in-
cluding the Palo Verde Irrigation District’s rotational fallowing program
that provides water to the Metropolitan Water District,340 and the Ari-
zona Water Bank, which allows Las Vegas to bank groundwater in
southern Arizona.341 But widespread use of temporary transfers is un-
likely to occur unless states adopt legislative reforms designed to pro-
mote their use.342 The three primary temporary transfer mechanisms—
rotational fallowing, dry-year options, and water banking—are de-
scribed briefly below, along with policy reforms that could lead to their
expanded use.
339. See generally, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-432 (2011); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505,
10505.5, 11460 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-118(1)(b)(II) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46-290 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.438(5) (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§72-5-22 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.22, 1086.1 (West 2011); TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 11.085 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104 (West 2011).
340. As noted in the Super Ditch case study, PVID’s fallowing program was instrumen-
tal in inspiring proponents of the Super Ditch concept. See supra text accompanying notes
271–274. R
341. See The Storage and Interstate Release Agreement, supra note 317. R
342. See, e.g., ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL TRANSFER METHODS, supra note 212, at 45–46 R
(explaining that legislative changes may be necessary to remove the barriers to water trans-
fers in Colorado).
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1. Rotational Fallowing
As a tool for moving more water from agricultural to urban use,
rotational fallowing has much to recommend. Farmers who participate
in the program agree to fallow a portion of their land, and can thus con-
tinue to farm on the remaining land, focusing their efforts on the most
productive lands or rotating the fallowed land from year to year.343 The
unused water made available by fallowing is then leased to a municipal-
ity.344 The MWD/PVID rotational fallowing program is usually cited as a
model for such programs, and for good reason. Despite the fact that the
program moves a substantial volume of water from agricultural to urban
use, it is remarkably simple, with one large buyer and one large seller
who both happen to have very senior water rights.345 The Super Ditch
proposal may suggest the more typical model, and it remains to be seen
whether that proposal will ever come to fruition. Several legal reforms,
however, could help make rotational fallowing programs like the Super
Ditch more practical.
First and foremost, some progress must be made to streamline the
normal water transfer process to accommodate temporary transfers. The
effort needed to design a program like the Super Ditch Company, with
its many potential sellers and multiple buyers, is substantial and expen-
sive. Yet, the parties have no assurance that their efforts to transfer the
relevant water rights will make it through the judicial process within a
reasonable length of time. Moreover, it seems possible, perhaps even
likely, that objections to the transfer will be filed and may succeed in
thwarting the project entirely or at least limiting the amount of water
available under the program, even if the transfer is ultimately approved.
Even if a state is not ready to embrace a wholesale shift to defin-
ing water rights in terms of consumptive use, it might consider doing so
in the case of temporary transfers. For example, the state could authorize
the prospective seller to apply to the appropriate agency official for a
consumptive use determination. The seller might even be asked to bear
the cost of the determination. Once the determination is made following
a process such as that suggested above,346 the state could authorize the
temporary transfer of the consumptive right. Such temporary transfers
might further be conditioned to reduce the transfer by 10 percent to pro-
tect stream flows and to account for potential calculation errors but they
343. ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL TRANSFERS, supra note 212, at 5. R
344. Id.
345. See supra text accompanying note 272; see also TERESA A. RICE & LAWRENCE J. R
MACDONNELL, COLO. WATER RES. RESEARCH INST., AGRICULTURAL TO URBAN WATER TRANS-
FERS IN COLORADO: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES AND OPTIONS 70–72 (1993).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 264–272. R
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would follow a minimal process, as proposed more generally for con-
sumptive use transfers.347 The law might also provide for minor adjust-
ments to the consumptive use allocation to reflect actual experience once
the program has been operating for several years.
In addition, state law must allow these rotational fallowing pro-
grams to operate over a long period of time consistent with the planning
needs of municipal water suppliers. The law might build in some capac-
ity for adjustments to be made as experience on the ground is gained but
without some assurance that these programs will offer long-term water
security (at least 30–40 years with provisions for renewal), cities are un-
likely to find rotational fallowing an attractive option.348
2. Dry-Year Options
Dry-year options, or interruptible water supply agreements, oper-
ate much like an emergency water supply.349 A city may contract with a
farmer to take that farmer’s water during dry years as defined in legisla-
tion, or preferably in the option contract. Dry year options allow cities to
avoid acquiring a much more costly permanent water supply where the
water resources might be needed only once every 10 years. As with rota-
tional fallowing agreements, this strategy will be viable for municipal
suppliers, only if the parties are willing and able to enter into long-term
contracts of at least 30 to 40 years, with some assurance of an opportu-
nity for renewal. If a city cannot secure a long-term commitment of ac-
cess to water resources in dry years, it lacks an incentive to negotiate the
option contract.
The Colorado interruptible water supply agreement statute350 of-
fers a useful example of how not to establish a dry-year option program.
Under that law, a water owner may agree to forego her use of a water
right during a dry year as provided under the terms of the agreement
and the State Engineer may approve and administer such agreements
without the need for the formal adjudication that would otherwise be
required for a water transfer.351 The State Engineer must, however, en-
sure that existing water rights would not be injured when the option is
347. See id.
348. See ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL TRANSFERS, supra note 212, at 5 (explaining that if a R
rotational fallowing agreement were used to provide water for a growing municipal de-
mand, the agreement would need to be “. . .long-term, renewable, or even perpetual. . .”).
349. See generally, MICHAEL O’DONNELL & BONNIE COLBY, THE UNIV. OF ARIZ. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. & RES. ECON., DRY-YEAR WATER SUPPLY RELIABILITY CONTRACTS: A TOOL FOR WATER
MANAGERS (2009), available at http://ag.arizona.edu/arec/pubs/facultypubs/ewsr-dyo-
Final-5-12-10.pdf.
350. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-309 (2011).
351. Id.
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exercised. Furthermore, the State Engineer must: (1) quantify the histori-
cal consumptive use of the water right, which then forms the basis for
the option amount; (2) describe the land where the water is decreed for
use; and (3) approve a plan for proper management of the land during
the period when it is fallowed.352 Although strict adherence to the no
injury rule could prove problematic, for reasons already discussed, these
are generally sensible requirements that could promote more stream-
lined decisions on these agreements.
Unfortunately, the statute goes on to limit the length of time for
any agreement to 10 years, which can be renewed only once, and then
only if the option has never been exercised.353 For a city seeking a secure
water supply, this limitation makes the Colorado interruptible water
supply agreement statute unworkable.354
Fixing the Colorado statute would not be especially difficult and it
suggests the contours of the law that might be adopted in other states. At
a minimum, states should make clear that de minimis injuries that might
result from exercising a dry year option are not actionable in court. Ac-
tionable injuries should specifically be defined to exclude a change in the
timing of return flows. Even more explicitly, the statute could simply
provide that where the state approves the transfer of the historic con-
sumptive use of a water right, perhaps less 10 percent, no injury to ex-
isting users shall be found. Without some provision like this, the parties
to any such agreement face the prospect of transaction costs that are es-
sentially as high as those for regular water transfers.
States should also allow option agreements to last for at least 30
years, perhaps longer, with the possibility of renewal for additional 30
year terms. Municipal water suppliers cannot plan for future water
needs unless they have some certainty about the availability of future
supplies. A well-defined option right can provide that assurance. Guar-
anteeing the availability of an option right over a ten-year period—as
authorized by the Colorado statute—is simply not adequate to incent
municipal suppliers to negotiate an agreement.
352. Id. at 309(3)(b).
353. Id. at 309(3)(c). The statute also provides that the option may not be exercised in
more than three of the ten years of the agreement. While this could be a limiting factor in
the utility of these agreements, it is understandable that the State would want to avoid
having parties use this provision to accomplish something that looks more like a perma-
nent transfer of the water.
354. Two minor applications were currently pending before the State Engineer, but at
the time of this writing no interruptible supply agreements have yet been approved under
this provision. Telephone Interview with Joanna Williams, Water Resource Engineer, Colo.
Div. Water Res. (Jul. 6, 2012).
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3. Water Banks
Water banks have been described broadly to encompass “an insti-
tutionalized process . . . to facilitate the transfer of developed water to
new uses.”355 This definition, however, could be viewed as encompassing
many other types of water transfers, including rotational fallowing and
dry-year options. Moreover, the definition fails to convey the sense that
water banks typically involve only temporary water transfers. A more
nuanced definition that better reflects the term “water bank” might de-
scribe it as a program that establishes a repository or “bank” where par-
ties can store water, together with a program for other parties to
withdraw water from the bank.
Water banks have been around for many years, dating back to the
early 1930s in Idaho.356 The earliest legislation, also from Idaho, was en-
acted in 1979.357 Since then, many other states have adopted some form
of water banking.358 Like other forms of temporary water transfers, water
banks can help make water supplies available to meet critical needs, es-
pecially during dry years. They can also help promote conservation by
providing water owners with a venue to market water supplies that they
are able to conserve,359 and by providing conservation groups and states
a source for water needed to protect stream flows and fisheries.
Water banks can simply involve a paper transaction where, for
example, water sellers answer a call from a buyer to forego the use of
water to which the sellers are entitled.360 This might happen where a
party interested in protecting stream flows purchases natural flow rights
from a seller for a period of one or more years. More commonly, water
banks involve physical storage, either in a reservoir or underground.
Water banking in this situation might typically involve a water district
with excess storage capacity, willing to sell that capacity to parties with
excess water rights. The district might then help facilitate a sale of the
water to a third party, or perhaps issue credit to the original owner that
355. Lawrence MacDonnell, Water Banks: Untangling the Gordian Knot of Western Water,
41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-6 (1995).
356. See MACDONNELL, ET AL., UNIV. OF COLO. NATURAL RES. LAW CTR., USING WATER
BANKS TO PROMOTE MORE FLEXIBLE WATER USE: FINAL REPORT 2-2 (1994).
357. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1761 to -1766 (West 2011).
358. See generally PEGGY CLIFFORD, CLAY LANDRY, & ANDREA LARSEN-HAYDEN, WASH.
DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, ANALYSIS OF WATER BANKS IN THE WESTERN STATES (2004) [hereinafter
ANALYSIS OF WATER BANK], available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0411011.pdf. This
excellent report offers a detailed discussion of the various approaches to water banking,
along with a comprehensive survey of water banks in the Western United States.
359. Id. at 3.
360. Id. at 4. The Washington Department of Ecology describes this as “institutional
banking.”
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\53-1\NMN103.txt unknown Seq: 60 11-APR-13 11:11
114 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 53
allows that original owner to take the water at some later time, probably
at some more convenient location on the stream. A good example of this
latter arrangement is the Arizona Water Bank, discussed previously,
which involves the State of Arizona and the Southern Nevada Water Au-
thority (SNWA). Under this program, which operates through the Ari-
zona Water Bank361, SNWA pays the State of Arizona to store Colorado
River water in its groundwater aquifer. When the SNWA needs the
water, it takes its entitlement from its regular diversion point on Lake
Mead, well above the storage aquifers.362 Despite the apparent advan-
tages of water banks there are few examples of successful banks,363 and
with limited exceptions, they do not currently seem to offer a reliable
solution to municipal water shortage problems.
As with virtually every other recommendation set forth in this ar-
ticle, promoting water banks begins with better defining the water rights
that are banked, so that they can be readily withdrawn by interested
buyers, even if those buyers live outside the water district’s service area.
While the SNWA arrangement with Arizona is somewhat unusual, it il-
lustrates the high potential for water banks to address municipal water
needs. For example, the cities along the Front Range of Colorado are all
near major streams that flow out of the mountains. Some of that water is
used for municipal purposes; most is dedicated to downstream farmers
on the plains who hold the most senior rights and who are often part of
large water districts or mutual ditch companies with significant capacity
to store water. If these cities could purchase some storage capacity in the
existing reservoirs and solicit willing sellers in the service area of the
reservoir to dedicate some their water rights for use by the city, the city
could then be issued credits that would allow it to divert that same
amount of water at an outtake near the city. Unfortunately, in Colorado
this transaction would almost certainly have to be adjudicated in a state
water court where it could be tied up for years. While the process might
be somewhat less cumbersome in other states, the predominant no injury
rule would still pose a significant obstacle to completing any such trans-
action. A streamlined transfer process for water bank transactions that
would allow a simple transfer of the consumptive use amount less 10
percent could go a long way toward reinvigorating the water bank
concept.
361. The Storage and Interstate Release Agreement, supra note 317, at 1–2. R
362. Id.
363. ANALYSIS OF WATER BANKS, supra note 358, at 16–18, Table 3. This report indicates R
that the only banks with high levels of activity are in California and Idaho. In the case of
Idaho, the water values are so low ($3–$10.50/acre foot) as to suggest that they are not
serving municipal needs.
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D. Take Advantage of Existing Distribution Systems to Move Water
As described in the NCWCD case study,364 that District has a huge
advantage in moving water efficiently because of the elaborate distribu-
tion system it has built, much of it funded by taxpayers. Indeed, the Dis-
trict could not continue to operate without the one mill tax that it
assesses every year on all property within the District’s massive service
area. The NCWCD and the many other publicly-supported water dis-
tricts throughout the West most likely own and operate the very best
water distribution systems in the country, and they are able to do so in
large part because they are tax-payer supported. But it does not seem fair
that they should enjoy a monopoly on the use of distribution systems
with excess capacity, when third parties might be in a position to use
that system to transfer water and thereby help address water supply
needs for urban and other uses.
Making excess distribution capacity available to third parties
would help promote efficient water transfers by affording at least some
water sellers a simple way to move water from the location of its current
use to the point of new use. It could also generate revenues for the water
district, although a process for setting reasonable prices for wheeling
water will have to be devised.
In 1986, the State of California enacted a “water wheeling statute”
that essentially adopts the policy suggested here.365 That law simply pro-
vides that “neither the state, nor any regional or local public agency may
deny a bona fide transferor of water the use of a water conveyance facil-
ity which has unused capacity, for the period of time for which that ca-
pacity is available, if fair compensation is paid.”366 The law goes on to
define such key terms as “fair compensation” and “unused capacity.”367
While evidence of the statute’s use is anecdotal, the courts have thus far
construed the statute broadly to encompass not only large systems such
as aqueducts and canals, but also local distribution systems.368
364. See text accompanying notes 185–190 (discussing the CBT distribution system). R
365. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1810–14 (West 2011).
366. Id. at § 1810.
367. Id. at § 1811.
368. See San Luis Coastal Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Morro Bay, 81 Cal. App. 4th 1044,
97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (2000); see also Metro. Water Dist. of S. California v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 80
Cal. App. 4th 1403, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (2000), where the Court of Appeal held that the
wheeling statutes did not preclude the MWD from including system-wide costs in calculat-
ing its wheeling rate, and furthermore that the statute did not require MWD to set its
wheeling rates on a case-by-case basis as transactions were proposed.
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VII. Conclusion
Water markets have long been viewed as a promising option for
addressing water shortages, and as a tool for meeting burgeoning urban
water demand in the western United States. But the traditional water
laws of western states make it difficult and in some cases even impossi-
ble to operate efficient water markets. As a result, water transfers and
water marketing have thus far proved to be tools of limited utility for
addressing the West’s future water needs. As drought, climate change,
and ever-increasing populations put more pressure on the West’s limited
water supplies, some additional movement of water from agricultural to
urban use seems inevitable. But water marketing offers the possibility of
much more. With modest reforms to current law, water marketing could
be an efficient and effective solution for most of the West’s future water
resource challenges. Furthermore, water marketing could displace the
need for destructive water development projects that continue to plague
water resource management.
The reforms proposed here are politically challenging but rela-
tively simple to describe and implement. Most fundamentally, water
rights must be redefined in terms of their consumptive use amount and
states must streamline the process for transferring the consumptive use
amount without undue obeisance to the “no injury” rule. Such a change
would no doubt be controversial, but it could be implemented strategi-
cally, either with pilot programs, or by adopting special legislation that
would streamline transfers for particular projects that are proposing in-
novative approaches to moving water. Water marketing has long been a
favorite topic of academics. The time for aggressively moving it into the
field is long overdue.
